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Summary
The penetration of unscheduleable generation will increase due to legislation
and eventually saving on fuel cost. This will cause an increase in uncertainty of
power-flow and drive up balancing market costs, the safety margin for N-1 will
have to increase. i.e. N-1 will not accurately represent the state of the system. A
security assessment scheme (SAS) that considers probabilistic uncertainty could
give financial savings and/or better security of supply.
In other words a power system with a high penetration of renewables is likely
to require a new type of security assessment scheme. Before that is done we must
be able to compare and evaluate existing and proposed schemes.
This thesis has two goals. Firstly, to be able to compare two security assess-
ment schemes to determine which is better for the current system. The work
details a computer program that combines a two stage Monte Carlo Sampler and
a power system simulator to generate a level of security. The number of simu-
lations that fail to converge within limits in N-1 and N-2 was compared to the
calculated level of security and found to not be a good predictor.
The second goal is to see how the level of security changes as the uncertainties
of renewable generation get added into a given power system. In doing this, the
effect of adding renewables can be quantified. The work found that if 15% of the
generation power comes from generators the are unscheduleable or stochastic the
security of supply does not greatly change. Whereas if the penetration is increased
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Nomenclature
x denotes a vector
xn denotes the value of x at the current time-step




h Time-step duration, seconds
λ Largest eigenvalue in a matrix
τ Smallest time constant in a matrix







ANN Artificial Neural Network
Brownouts Poor power quality, specifically a low voltage
Cascading Outages A fault, leading to further faults.
GA Genetic Algorithm
GPGPU General Purpose Graphics Processing Unit
IEEE-RTS The IEEE Reliability Test System (see Section 8.1.1)
Islanded A power system that has been separated into two or more parts
Memoization A computing optimisation used to speed up computer programs. It
does this by storing a table of previously-processed inputs so
that they do not have to be re-calculated.
MCP Measure, Correlate, Predict
MCS Monte Carlo Sampling (see Section 7.2)
MTTF Mean Time To Fail
MTTR Mean Time To Repair
NWP Numerical Weather Prediction
N-1 A deterministic SAS where only single component outages
are considered
N-x A deterministic SAS where only ‘x’ simultaneous failures
are considered
xv
ODE Ordinary Differential Equation
Safety Margin A margin of error given to SAS to account for inaccuracies
SAS Security assessment scheme (see Chapter 6)
SO System Operator (e.g. National Grid in the UK)
Unacceptable System A power system with a generator/load imbalance, components
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1.1.1 What People Expect
Electrical Power Systems are ubiquitous; they effect every aspect of our everyday
lives. We rely on them to provide us with as much power as we demand at any
time without notice and failure is treated harshly. It is simply assumed that we
have affordable, flexible power.
This is highlighted by the London black-out on 28th August 2003 affecting an
estimated 500,000 people. London Mayor Ken Livingstone declared the situation
a “catastrophic failure”, CNN reported “Power cut cripples London”, BBC news’
description is equally panic stricken:
“Thousands of passengers were left stranded during the evening rush
hour by the black-out, which halted 1,800 trains and closed 60% of the
Tube network . . . Pubs lit candles as people left work to seek refuge,
many staying late into the night as crammed buses and taxis tried to
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help thousands of people to get home. ” [11]
Surprisingly, this black-out directly affected only about 10% of the population
of London and power was restored to most users within 30 minutes. A black-
out in north-east America in the same year cost an estimated $6 billion USD.
Evidently any failure in the supply of electricity has serious social and financial
consequences.
1.1.2 The Technical Difficulty
Behind the scenes we have one of the largest man-made devices ever created. It
is hard to think of something other than the Internet taking up so much space
and requiring such cooperation, coordination and control.
To maintain supply is not a simple task. Electricity cannot be easily stored
in the required quantities and therefore production must match demand at every
moment. This supply of power mostly comes from either fuel shipments (often
from unstable countries) or from weather dependent sources, which cannot be
relied upon.
As well as matching the prediction in demand, the selection of generators is
important. Different generators have different times for starting up or varying the
power output and the economics of generation cost have to be considered. This
is not the only concern to the system operator: transmission lines have thermal
limits; lightning strikes cause temporary faults; end users are unpredictable etc.
(other factors are discussed later in Section 6.1). In spite of these difficulties
energy use is on the rise.
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Figure 1-1: Historic Power Use
1.1.3 The Environmental Factor
We are living in a world in flux. Climatic cycles brought on by natural occurrences
cause ice to cover much of the globe then retreat flooding massive areas and killing
entire species. It appears that our own actions have put us on the brink of another
change. Regardless of the cause, melting of the ice caps and a massive increase
in tropical storms and tidal waves are a bad thing for the human race. Life itself
is likely to survive any changes we cause but there will be mass extinction, huge
uninhabitable areas, and a new landscape. If it occurred it would be at least the
sixth similar mass extinction on the planet. Life will go on, what we want is to
keep the status quo.
As it looks now the main changes we need to make include keeping or ex-
panding the rainforest and other havens of biodiversity and stopping the release
of greenhouse gasses. A large part of the greenhouse gasses are from electrical
power systems. This means that the choice of components will likely be skewed
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toward those which are environmentally friendly, or at least more friendly than
alternatives. The change to renewable power will also come from a financial point
of view as well. Once the price of installation drops, there are massive savings to
be had in running costs due to the freedom from fuel.
The UK government have performed a review of climatic change from an
economic standpoint. Even ignoring ethical issues it advocated action to prevent
global warming as the quotes below indicate.
“The scientific evidence is now overwhelming: climate change is a
serious global threat, and it demands an urgent global response. This
Review has assessed a wide range of evidence on the impacts of climate
change and on the economic costs, and has used a number of different
techniques to assess costs and risks. From all of these perspectives,
the evidence gathered by the Review leads to a simple conclusion: the
benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of
not acting.
Climate change will affect the basic elements of life for people around
the world: access to water, food production, health, and the environ-
ment. Hundreds of millions of people could suffer hunger, water short-
ages and coastal flooding as the world warms.
Using the results from formal economic models, the Review estimates
that if we don’t act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will
be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and
forever. If a wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account,
the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more.” [92]
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1.1.4 The Future
We can imagine a future when we have much less reliance on fossil fuels. Where
our power is generated by nuclear fission, producing no nuclear waste or by mas-
sive solar banks in the world’s deserts using solar power to charge hydrogen fuel
cells which are shipped around the world. Once electricity can be stored in large
quantities it gets easier to manage. We can rely much less on the pylons and
lines.
1.1.5 The Present
This future is a long way off; the technologies needs to advance. Nuclear fission,
solar photovoltaic cells and hydrogen storage need to be much more efficient
before they become viable alternatives. Our attitudes need to change as well.
We need to recognise that a change is needed and allow for it. Deliberation
about the causes of climate change are a pointless blame game that detracts
from the goal.
Sources such as the British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) and National
Grid indicate that wind power will supply the major constituent of the UK 2010
target [29, 66]. This is because the technology involved is relatively well estab-
lished, with a long lifetime and positive public opinion, however the problems
arise because of the random nature of generation, the quality of the power pro-
duced by wind, and instabilities it imposes on the grid. With this change we need
a new way to analyse power systems to cope with the uncertainty that dealing
with the weather brings.
Some issues are addressed by the BWEA, The Carbon Trust, Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI), National Grid, and The Office of Gas and Electricity
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Figure 1-2: Installed Capacity
Markets (Ofgem) but the general consensus is, that as of now, renewable power
is not causing a significant enough impact to necessitate a change in the tools
or practises. As can be seen from (Fig 1-2) installed capacity of renewables is
currently low. This will, however, change in part due to the UK target of having
20% of supplied electricity from renewable sources with most of this (70-80%)
coming from wind power.
A key publication on this subject is the ’Renewable Network Impact Study’
by the Carbon Trust & DTI [30], it states that:
“At the current target levels, intermittency is not a significant issue
affecting the development of renewable generation. However, system
balancing costs will increase as the penetration of intermittent renew-
ables increases, and balancing costs could increase substantially with
regard to meeting the 2020 aspirational target.” [30]
It is not only intermittency that will become a problem. Other factors such
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as stability and scheduling will have to be addressed as well. Consequently there
is now a real need to develop a new tool to more accurately assess current and
future electrical networks. This will enable the system to be operated closer to
its limits enabling large savings.
UK energy policy aims to cut carbon dioxide emissions by ten percent from
1990 levels by the year 2010 and 20% by the year 2010 as part of ’The Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ [98].
As well as the longer term plan of a 50 percent decrease by the year 2050 [38].
It is encouraging low emissions in electricity generation through schemes such as
Renewable Obligation Certificates and the Climate Change Levy.
This will direct the changing face of electricity generation and transmission.
These systems have their own intricacies and problems. Renewable generation
will be the mainstay of the industry. One can already see the impact of such
schemes, wind farms currently have an installed capacity of 2.3 GW in the UK
with a massive 15 GW in planning, approved, or in construction [25]. Traditional
generator output can be controlled but that is not the case with new generation
like wind turbines or photovoltaics. These are not only unable to be controlled but
cannot be accurately predicted either. The focus of these concerns and actions
can be seen from Government publications such as the 2007 white-paper [38] and
its follow-up from the DTI [39].
1.1.6 This Work
This work is an intermediate step, at a time when there is a large number of
unpredictable generators and a reliance on a power grid of lines and pylons. It
is intended as a comprehensive account of how to look at power system security
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in such a system. It aims to show how the current method of analysing power
systems will not be the most effective, and provides a scheme to compare methods
of security assessment.
The system operator has the overall responsibility for ensuring the system is
in an acceptable state, that is, everyone receives enough power. They can make
predictions but only receive details on generation and demand half an hour before
power is to be delivered. In this time they must perform simulation and analysis,
then if required contact the generators telling them to change their output to
make the system acceptable.
The current method to do this does not consider intermittent generation and
hence will not be optimal in a system with a high penetration of renewables.
Before a new security assessment schemes is used it must be tested. The
primary goal of this thesis is to create a method to compare security assessment
schemes. This require significant computer power and an advanced power sys-
tem simulator hence this thesis details work that has been done in modifying
simulation tools to increase their speed.
1.2 Aims & Objectives
This thesis can be broken down into a few main areas of research. These inevitably
lead to other required areas of work. The following list highlights these main aims
and objectives:
• To see how unscheduleable generation, such as wind farms, effect system
wide security of supply.
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• To see how the security assessment scheme, N-1 1, is affected by a high
penetration of unscheduleable generation.
• To do this requires the ability to compare different security assessment
schemes, which is a useful tool in its own right.
1.3 Contribution
This work has four main areas of contribution in the area of power system security
assessment. This contribution is mainly from the point of view of a system
operator. It aims to:
• Highlight the need for a change in security assessment,
• Develop a new way to assess a security assessment scheme,
• See if N-1 is a good predictor of system security,
• Create a novel method for comparing security assessment schemes, and
• Compare the security of power systems with differing penetrations of wind
power.
The software that was created to achieve the aims has a number of other
potential uses. In addition to being able to compare different SAS it is itself a
security assessment scheme. In it’s current form it would have to be used more
like a planning tool but with enough computing power it could become a powerful
tool for the control room.
1Although N-1 is used throughout this thesis to mean only single outages are considered in
reality system operators are more likely to use a modified form of N-1 or N-2. A better example
is the requirements laid out in National Grid’s SQSS document.
9
Another facet of the computer program is to aid in planning decisions. If
there is a proposed change to the network the program can be used to show
how that change will affect the security of supply. This was done in this thesis
to compare a system with and without wind generation but could just as easily
be used to look at changes such as the addition of a new transmission line or
an analysis of how storage should improve security of supply. In Section 7.5.2
further applications of the computer program are discussed.
One final feature of the program is to locate components of the network that
are likely to cause security problems. In the large number of simulations that are
run certain components will invariably cause problems more often than others,
this data could be very useful for network planners.
1.4 Structure of This Thesis
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis first describes current power sys-
tems in Chapter 2. This is followed by security issues that can arise with power
systems (Chapter 3). Next, the future of power system is introduced focusing on
two areas: generation, and demand (Chapter 4). At this point the reader should
understand the relevant factors in power systems and the challenges posed to a
system operator in the future.
The next part looks at how one assesses security. Chapter 5 looks in detail at
two simulation methods for power systems as well as issues to consider when in-
cluding wind power generation. This includes the authors extensive modifications
to both dynamic and static simulators.
Following that, in Chapter 6, SAS are introduced looking at both how they
are currently implemented as well as proposed modifications in the literature.
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The chapter ends by highlighting the limitations of deterministic methods for
systems with a high wind penetration. The method of analysis in this chapter
leads to the creation of a tool for comparing SAS which is introduced in Chapter
7. Chapter 7 ends by listing limitations to the proposed method as well as possible
applications.
Chapter 8 details the computer software used to form the results. It also
contains details of various test procedures used to verify the accuracy of the
work. The next chapter, Chapter 9, contains the results and discussion of various
experiments that use the previously discussed computer program. It includes an
analysis to see if N-1 or N-2 is a good predictor of overall system security and a
study into the effect of the introduction wind generation into a system.
The thesis ends with a conclusion and proposed further work.
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1.5 Exemplary Background Texts
• Sustainable Energy - without the hot air: David J C MacKay [62]
• Operating in 2020: National Grid [67]
• Power System Stability and Control: Kundur [59]
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• The Economics of Climate Change: Nicholas Stern [92]
• Renewable Network Impact Study: Carbon Trust & DTI [30]
• Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems: Roy Billinton [19]
• Reliability Assessment of Power Systems using Monte Carlo Methods: Roy
Billinton [17]
• Seven Year Statement: National Grid [66]




This chapter introduces the main players in electrical power systems. It talks
about their roles and how they operate in the market. It then goes on to look at
some physical components and discusses their use and control, possible consider-
ations for the market, system operator, environment; and how this might change
as we move to the future.
2.1 Structure
The privatisation of the UK power system, has organised the network into differ-
ent sectors. Some are physical divisions, others trade electricity as a commodity
without ownership of any part of the network. This section provides background
information about the current UK electricity market, its main market partici-
pants and their roles.
The regulator, OFGEM in the UK, promotes competition by enforcing regu-
lations on the monopoly companies which run gas and electricity networks, paid
for by an annual license fee from the regulated companies [72]. The transmission
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Figure 2-1: Physical Structure of an electric power system
system and distribution systems, both monopolies, make up the physical network
of lines, transformers and busbars that transport electricity to the end-users.
The Transmission System Owner (TSO) in England and Wales is National Grid
Transco, which is also the UK System Operator (SO); responsible for maintaining
a constant and consistent supply to the end-users.
Historically, all power generation was connected to the transmission system,
which in turn was connected to one of the 12 distribution systems at grid supply
points. The distribution system supplies electricity to the end-user at a lower
voltage.
New generation, particularly renewables are being connected directly to the
distribution system. The transmission system owner and Distribution System
Owners (DSO) are paid through connection charges and use-of-system charges
from the generators and suppliers. Adjacent networks are connected together
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Figure 2-2: The UK electricity market
through interconnects. These allow the transmission of power across most of
Western Europe. This structure is shown in Fig 2-1.
Suppliers buy electricity from generators and sell to end-users. This simpli-
fies the process for the end-users and enables competition by promoting market
liquidity. The generators, which supply electricity, form deals with suppliers and
end-users in a number of ways. Bilateral contracts are a two-way deal between
suppliers and generators stating the quantity of power traded, the price, and the
time over which that power is to be delivered. This is done in half hour blocks, of-
ten months in advance. Exchanges, similar to stock exchanges, allow anonymous
trading of power in a real time market closer to the time that the energy is to be
used. This enables suppliers to fine tune their purchased power to match their
predicted demand using more accurate load forecasts close to the Final Physical
Notification (FPN). The FPN is the point, one hour ahead of real-time, at which
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Figure 2-3: Overview of market structure
all generators and suppliers must inform the system operator, who is also the
transmission system owner in England and Wales, of the electricity inputs and
outputs to the system. Fig 2-2 shows the transfer of money between players and
Fig 2-3 shows the timescale under which the market operates.
The trading process up to this point has been entirely market-driven but
this can violate transmission constraints. Constraints make sure that lines are
not overloaded and there are no inter-area oscillations or other such stability
problems. The system operator is able to make additional trades so the system
operates in a secure way. This is called the balancing mechanism. Any trader
or generator can bid into the balancing market with a list of prices to increase
or decrease their power use by various quantities; these bid and offer prices are
what the system operator uses to stabilise the network.
A system operator can decide to tell a generator to back off and another
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Figure 2-4: Balancing Market Operation
to increase power output for either stability or financial reasons. The system
operator will get paid by a generator for telling them to back off generation.
The system operator uses this money to pay another generator to supply the
electricity to the end-user. This is illustrated in Fig 2-4.
The generator who is being backed off still gets the contracted money from
the end-user but generates less, saving fuel and money. The generator who has
increased output, profits by setting their price higher than their fuel costs. The
end-user simply pays his contracted fee and receives the requested power, without
being aware of these transactions.
The price that the system operator has to pay to increase energy is called
the System Buy Price (SBP) and the price of telling a generator to back off its
generation, the System Sell Price (SSP). The system operator can actually make
a profit from the balancing mechanism by backing off, i.e. reducing generation
output of expensive generators and using cheaper generation instead. But some-
time they will lose money if they need to use an expensive generator for stability
reasons.
If there is a weak network, i.e. one with stability issues, there will need to be
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a lot of rescheduling of generation. This will require more expensive generation
to be used, causing higher balancing market prices. Certain generators may forgo
making bilateral contracts hoping they will get a higher price in the balancing
market.
If a generator knows that it has a stabilising influence on the network they
may deliberately set their price higher knowing that the system operator will have
to use them. Extra uncertainty in the network means that more generation needs
to be kept in the balancing market, again driving up costs. Accurate predictions
of the load and stability are a way of reducing the balancing market costs.
The system operator has to consider cost and stability when deciding which
generators to back off and which to request more generation from. Deciding
the best combination is known as the problem of economic dispatch and it is a
relatively straight-forward process of ranking all generators by price and selecting
all the cheapest ones to run at full power. Unfortunately it is not that simple in
practise.
It is complicated by the fact that losses in the lines must be taken into account.
These losses change with each mix of generation. A load-flow (power-flow) must
be done to find the losses. Hence the solution to economic dispatch is often known
as optimal power flow. Other factors, such as voltage limits and constraints,
should be taken into account to find the optimal power flow. Constraints are most
often taken as fixed (steady-state) guidelines to stop stability or power quality
problems. In reality these may be too constrictive given the specific generators
and loads used at that time. A more accurate idea of stability can be obtained
by performing a more detailed simulation and hence the system can be operated
more economically. Zhang gives a detailed description of optimal power flow and
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Figure 2-5: Weekly Demand for UK
using dynamic simulation to improve optimal power flow [107].
If any generators or loads deviate from the contracted trades or a fault occurs
during delivery of power then the system operator must pay for this discrepancy as
the generation/demand balance must be maintained. The use of extra generation
is paid at the SBP. This is illustrated in Fig 2-3; on chapter ten of National Grid’s
Seven Year Statement [66]; or on Elexon’s information sheets [42].
The system operator forecasts the load to assist in maintaining equilibrium
and stability. This relies on the fact that although individual consumption by end-
users is erratic, when aggregated together the load is predictable. For instance,
there is a certain cyclic pattern based upon on work hours, but this will change
with seasonal and temperature fluctuations. A typical weekly demand profile can
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be seen in Fig 2-5. As unpredictable generation, such as wind power becomes
more popular load forecasting will become more difficult requiring more advanced
tools for the assessment of power system operation. Wind forecasting has to be
combined with normal load forecasting, adding to uncertainty.
2.2 Control
End-users expect power to be both constant and consistent, i.e. the power should
always be available and not vary from what is expected both in terms of voltage
and frequency. For domestic users in the UK this expected value is 240V at 50
Hz. Maintaining a consistent connection requires the generation-load balance to
be equal and for the system to remain in synchronous operation. The balance
of generation and demand to some extent is maintained by the market but not
all load or generation can be predicted accurately; line losses, faults and outages
cause addition discontinuities. This imbalance must be corrected by the system
operator in real-time. Most systems aim to operate at N-1 security, meaning that
if any one contingency occurs the system will remain stable and there will be no
system-wide problems. Contingencies include user error, faults in the equipment
and environmental effects such as lightning and freezing rain.
The challenges of supplying power can categorised as follows:
• Maintaining good power quality. This relates to making sure that the power
delivered is constantly at the correct voltage and frequency, i.e. there are
no sags or swells, the voltage does not flicker, no under/over voltage, and
no deviations from a perfect sine wave at 50Hz.
• Keeping system synchronism i.e. ensuring that every generator turbine is
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approximately the same frequency and phase.
• Requested power being delivered to most loads i.e no load shedding
• Keeping each component within limits for voltage/current/power most of
the time (i.e. no components that are overloaded or experiencing voltage
collapse)
• Making the system reasonably fault tolerant
• Supplying energy at minimum cost with minimum environmental impact
Obviously there are many trade-offs involved for the SO. These challenges
are compounded by the fact that in the UK this optimisation must be done one
hour before the power is to be delivered. To do this optimisation the main control
method is to trade electricity, as described before, to change the output of certain
generators. It is also possible that certain loads will be disconnected for short
periods of time.
To allow the system operator to control the power system a number of services
are required. One service is the system reserve. The need for the system reserve
arises from the fact that the start-up time for generators is too long to maintain
balance and the system inertia is small, hence some generators must be kept on
as a spinning reserve, ready to supply extra power should it be needed. Other
control mechanisms include AVR, Governors and SVC, which give the ability to
control reactive power, frequency, and voltage.
Defining the overall stability of an entire system is not an easy task but it is
one extensively studied. A system that looks like it is on the boundary of stability
may in-fact be able to be pushed further due to complex power electronics keeping
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it stable, whereas one that looks to be completely stable may be teetering on the
edge. This will be covered in more depth in Section 3.4.
2.3 Generation
The basic means of generation has not changed since Edison’s time. Some ex-
ternal power source, generally known as the prime mover, rotates a section of a
generator called the rotor. This causes a voltage drop across the stationery part
of the generator, conveniently called the stator, forcing a current to flow in the
wires in the same way a motor uses electrical energy to convert back to kinetic
energy.
The source of the prime mover’s energy, i.e. what drives the rotating turbines,




• Heat from the earth’s core (geothermal),
• Using focused sunlight (solar parabolic trough),
• Burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas, diesel).
All of these generation methods use a large amount of heat, which is mostly
wasted. Combined heat and power (CHP), uses the excess heat from power sta-
tions in nearby homes, shops or factories greatly increasing efficiency.
Not all methods of moving the turbines use steam, other methods include:
using wind power, the movement of waves or tidal flow.
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Photovoltaic cells, more commonly known as solar panels, do not use turbines
at all. The direct conversion of sunlight to electricity is performed by an electrical
process.
All of these different types of generators have pros and cons to their use.
2.3.1 Scheduling
Most generators can produce a requested quantity of energy up to a maximum
value. To change the power output takes different times in different types of
generation. A faster time is better from the point of view of system stability,
and these will be more likely to operate in the balancing market. Invariably the
easier they are to change, the greater their variable costs.
Nuclear is not generally varied and is run at full power due to its low cost and
slow speed to change output. CCGT, a type of gas turbine, is more expensive but
can change its output quickly hence it is used in the balancing market where the
power is requested shortly before supply. Generators that cannot be scheduled
include wind power, which only generates when the wind is blowing. If there are
more unscheduleable generators then more uncertainty is introduced causing an
increase in the number of expensive gas turbines that are needed to run. To some
extent this cancels out the carbon saving.
2.3.2 Predictability
Those generators that cannot be scheduled have to be predicted and the accuracy
of these predictions is an important factor. If the accuracy of the prediction is
high enough they can be treated the same as a normal generator. It is also
desirable if times of high power output correlate to the times of high power use.
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Photovoltaics do not have this correlation because they do not generate on an
overcast winter’s day, which is when power use is highest.
If predictions become more accurate then extra balancing market costs de-
crease. This could happen by improving the prediction techniques themselves,
or it could come from having more dispersed wind farms. The greater the geo-
graphical distance the less correlation of wind speeds and hence the more likely
that they will average out to a more predictable number.
2.3.3 Power Output
Obviously different generators will have different abilities to produce power.
Larger traditional power stations, for example, are often more efficient. Tidal
or hydroelectric stations have a power output limited by the quantity of water
stored or flowing but can produce a lot of power when water is available.
The efficiencies of plants are increasing, though many types are effected by
economies of scale. The larger they are the more efficient. This does present a
problem if you start to rely on a few large power stations and they break. One
of the major road blocks to the introduction of nuclear fusion is the economies of
scale. Renewables often do not have the same problem. For instance, wind power
comes from many small turbines hence wind farms can be built of any size.
2.3.4 Fuel Type
It is not wise for a network to rely too heavily on one fuel, particularly if that
fuel has to be imported. Fluctuating prices, political uncertainty and dwindling
supplies mean that a good fuel mix is expedient. Many renewables have the
advantage of not needing any fuel deriving their power from natural processes
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like the sun, tides, or the earth’s heat. Nuclear Fission has the problem of the
toxic waste it produces, fossil fuels cause greenhouse gasses and are increasingly
taxed for that reason. Biomass can use waste or cleared foliage; in either case
you are initially increasing the carbon in the atmosphere but there is a great
improvement from then on as the same quantity will be cycled through rather
than the continuous increase of fossil fuelled generators.
2.3.5 Efficiency
Certain types of generation produce more power with the same quantity of fuel
and are therefore favourable. CHP schemes gain very high efficiencies if all the
heat can be put to good use. Efficiency will drop if the location is not ideal. If
the generator is connected to a low voltage or weak part of the grid it will have
greater losses. Obviously generators that do not require fuel do not have this
problem.
2.3.6 Emissions
Aside from the ethical issues, it is financially efficient for a generator to have
low emissions. Government directives like the ’climate change levy’ or ROC
[39] provide definite incentives for carbon capture schemes and increased fuel
efficiency. Nuclear power produces no greenhouse gasses but does generate ra-
dioactive waste. It is difficult to provide a direct comparison between the two.
When looking at the emissions of a generator it is important to consider
emissions during construction and deconstruction as well as while running and
the utilisation. A gas plant that is run at half its installed capacity will be less
efficient than running at full capacity although, due to the nature of gas plants,
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it may be a good idea for security reasons to keep some reserve to deal with
uncertainty. A wind farm that has a large initial carbon cost might be installed
but unless it is fully utilised it will never regain that initial deficit.
2.3.7 Stability
Certain generation has a better ability to deal with faults in other parts of the
system or may be able to supply more reactive power. Generators that can
change their power output rapidly generally have a stabilising effect by being
able to compensate for faults on other parts of the system quickly. It is not only
the physical generator that determines the effect on stability but its location.
Connections near the load centres or at higher voltage are more stable than low
voltage or electrically distant connections. Due to the requirements of wind power
they often have to be on electrically distant connections as shown by Swisher et
al.:
“Perhaps the most significant barrier is transmission simply because
the wind resource is typically found at a distance from load centres.” [95]
2.3.8 Location
Generators have many different requirements for their physical location. This
impacts both on their power output and stability. The location may be affected
by public opinion as well as optimum location for generation. As stated before
the voltage level they are connected at is important, as is the distance from the
main load centres. Though it is unlikely that larger generating stations will be
built near load centres as these are often in an area of high population density.
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2.3.9 Technology
If the technology has not been proved commercially it will lack investment and
hence widespread development. Nuclear Fission suffers from a lack of research
into toxic waste. More research is needed to find how to properly dispose of the
waste. This will not happen until there are new nuclear generators, but the new
generators will not be built until we have a better waste management strategy.
Governments seem to be imposing new restrictions and targets on a yearly
basis. The kind of long-term planning that is needed when deciding to invest
in a new technology become very difficult when governments keeps moving the
goalposts. This can hinder the uptake of new technologies, even if the new laws
are meant to help them.
2.3.10 Lifetime
A longer life means more time to recoup investment costs; giving a larger profit
over the life of the project. The first generation of photovoltaics degraded to an
unusable point in a few years. This made them an unsound investment, although
their lifetime is increasing through new research.
Many generators in the UK are coming to the end of their planned lifetimes.
We will see an influx of new generators and revamps of old generators to cope
with this change. It is important to consider the generators that we install now
are likely to still be running for the next 40 years. This must be considered with
respect to our long-term plans.
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2.3.11 Set-up Cost
A large set-up cost can be offset if there is high power output and a long lifetime
but it is still a major factor in finding investors. Renewables tend to have a high
installation cost, as well as being an unproven technology. It is quite a large
risk, though with low running costs and an expected increase in fuel costs and
emissions taxes, there could be a large reward.
2.3.12 Generation Cost
Staff costs, maintenance and fuel costs are major factors in the profitability of
a power station. At certain times it might be more profitable to not run your
generator at all. Wind power has very few overheads, so is a very attractive option
from this point of view. But despite having very few overheads unscheduleable
generation has very little purchasing power. There is no advantage in not selling,
regardless of how low the price is; and wind generators do not have the ability
to make long-term contracts without making some contingency in-case the wind
is not blowing. One way in which a gas generator can lower costs is by buying
wind power to reduce the fuel costs of gas turbines.
2.3.13 Distance from load
Due to the constraints imposed by the type of generation, they may have to be
placed far from the end-user. This causes large power loss in the lines resulting in
extra infrastructure having to be developed. Wind farms are best located offshore
or in remote areas. There is then a trade-off between connecting the power to
the nearest point on the Grid or installing new lines, giving a higher installation
cost but better operational efficiencies.
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The connection of large power stations to remote parts of the Grid can cause
stability problems, such as when where one area starts to oscillate against another.
2.3.14 Electricity Cost
A number of these factors come together to produce a cost for the power gener-
ated. High power output, low emissions and high predictability mean that the
generator should make bilateral contracts for all its generation; this is exactly
what nuclear power does. CCGT are very quick at varying their power, hence
will only contract for a fraction of their installed capacity. They will instead bid
in the balancing market. The decision whether to sign bilateral contracts or bid
into the balancing market becomes more complicated with hydroelectric or wind
power. Hydroelectric dams cannot generate continuously, in-fact it uses electric-
ity to store energy by pumping water back into a higher reservoir. Their decision
of when to generate and when to recharge requires an intimate knowledge of the
market. There is a risk attached to signing bilateral contracts with unpredictable
generation because there is no guarantee that they will be able to produce the
contracted power.
2.4 Demand
The demand is the sum total of power requirements across the Grid. On a small
scale it is unpredictable, because there is no way of knowing when someone will
turn their TV on. Yet aggregated across the country it becomes much more
manageable a cyclic patterns emerge.
Climate plays a major role in demand: Hot countries experiencing a peak in
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the summer daytime when air-conditioners are running; cold countries are more
affected by heating in the winter. There are daily cycles caused by industry,
down to one-off occurrences like the final episode of a popular TV programme.
All these factors must all be taken into account and this calculation is usually
done with an error of less than 5%.
Demand has seen constant growth throughout the lifetime of the Grid and
this is likely to continue. This growth is likely to increase as we move away from
using fossil fuels directly in homes and rely on Grid supplied power for things like
heating and cooking.
There is a trend to reduce the demand on Grid power by local supply. If
a large number of end users have installed small renewable energy generators
in their home their power demand, as seen from the Grid, will be significantly
reduced. It remains to be seen which of these factors dominate but regardless
the impact of a large scale change in power demand should be examined.
2.5 Storage
Other than demand side management (DSM), storage is currently inefficient. It is
not easy to store large quantities of electrical power for long periods. This results
in a careful balancing act of deciding how much energy will be lost in storage
and if that is worth the savings of not using an expensive generator. Jamasb [52]
provides a good introduction to possible storage technologies and their uses.
One storage method that does not suffer the problems of power loss for long-
term storage is pumped hydroelectric. Unfortunately there are only a limited
number of sites where this is a viable option and many of them are already in
use.
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Flywheels are a good storage system for their specific niche. They basically
consist of large spinning platters to store the power. Electricity can be transferred
extremely rapidly; i.e. a fully charged flywheel can be discharged in a matter of
minutes whereas a battery of equivalent size may take many hours. Flywheels
do not hold charge well meaning they are not suited to long-term storage but as
they require little maintenance and have relatively high energy density they are
good for short term averaging of power fluctuations such as averaging output of
a wind farm or to smooth the peaks in demand when electric trains start moving.
Super-capacitors store energy as electric charge. Like flywheels they do not
hold their charge for long periods of time and require little maintenance over their
long lifetime. But they are good for short term averaging or can be used with a
battery to prevent unnecessary use, which will increase the batteries lifespan. In
about one month they may lose half their stored power, whereas a conventional
battery may only lose 10%.
Hydrogen is probably the most promising technology for long-term energy
storage. When power is stored it can remain in that state for long periods of
time without causing power loss. It can be used inside modified combustion
engines as well as fuel cells. Hydrogen could become a direct replacement for
fossil fuels if efficiencies can be improved. This could include generating energy
from renewable sources where it is cheap, storing that power, and transporting
the hydrogen in cargo ships across the world.
If this was to happen it would have the effect of removing the need for peaking
generators. A base load of generators would generate at full power, for efficiency,
all the time. Any excess power would be stored and used when needed. Un-
scheduleable generation would either be used or stored in the same way. This
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would make the task of the system operator easier but significantly different from
how it is now. Unfortunately this will not happen until either the efficiencies of
hydrogen get far above 50% or a new long-term mass energy store is found.
2.6 Network
Power networks are likely to see greater interconnection in the future. There is
already plans for greater links between the UK and mainland Europe. Intercon-
nection allows both countries to import energy during peak time, which tend to
differ between countries. This results in less use of expensive peaking generation
but it comes at a cost. Larger systems are more complex, particularly if there is
more than one SO. Additionally there is the problem of over reliance. Italy has
become dependent on its interconnections, it does not have enough capacity to
supply itself with power at peak times.
2.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter provides background information relating to electrical power systems
and how electricity markets operate. It does this in preparation for a more
detailed discussion on likely changes in future powers systems in a later chapter.
After briefly discussing some of the main issues that face electrical power
systems the factors that affect generators are discussed. These are looked at





A power system must be reliable, that is, it must be able to supply power at an
acceptable quality to those that demand it without damaging system components.
A reliable system is one they can stay secure long-term.
Power System Reliability can be seen as having two components: adequacy
and security. The NERC Planning standards [69] provide a commonly cited
definition for these terms. They are basically split by time-frame. Adequacy is
long-term planning reliability and security is short-term operational reliability.
For a broad overview of the methods used within power system reliability
refer to the three books by Billinton, Li, and Allen [19, 17, 18]
3.2 Adequacy
Adequacy looks at power system reliability from a long-term planning point of
view and determines if there is sufficient generation and network capacity in place
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to deal with all likely scenarios. This may involve physical changes to the system
such as reinforcing transmission lines or building new components.
3.3 Security
Security deals with the day-to-day operation of ensuring the system is acceptable.
It must be able to maintain this acceptable state given changes in the system
(known as contingencies) and environment (weather, customer demands, etc.)
[9].
A secure system is one that is stable and within operating limits following any
credible disturbance. It therefore depends on both the likelihood of a disturbance
occurring and its consequence.
Anything outside of this list of contingencies is considered too unlikely to take
into account. Power System control is the actions and administration required
to maintain, as far as possible, secure and safe operation.
3.4 Stability
“Power System Stability may be broadly defined as that property of
power system that enables it to remain in a state of operating equilib-
rium under normal operating conditions and to regain an acceptable
state of equilibrium after being subjected to a disturbance.” [59]
“Power system stability is the ability of an electric power system for
a given initial operating condition, to regain a state of operating equi-
librium after being subjected to a physical disturbance, with most sys-
tem variables bounded so that practically the entire system remains
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Figure 3-1: Classification of Power System Stability [60]
intact.” [60]
Although stability is essentially a single problem it can help analysis to cat-
egorise stability as in Fig 3-1. This allows simplifying assumptions which are
essential for meaningful analysis. The highly non-linear nature of power systems
can lead to various forms of instability interacting. One form of instability may
inevitability cause another. Stability can be categorised number of ways:
1. Size of disturbance (small, large)
2. Variable affected (frequency, voltage, rotor angle)
3. Nature of effect (dynamic or static)
3.5 Disturbances
Any change to a power systems operating condition is know as a disturbance.
These are categorised as either small or large. Small disturbances in the form of
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load changes occur continually and due to their size can often be analysed using
linearisation. Whereas, large disturbances, such as the loss of a transmission line,
cause a system-wide transient response. A line loss can be though of as a transient
followed by a change in the system topology.
Machine rotor speeds will change due to the difference between created me-
chanical and electrical torque giving rise to different busbar voltages. This results
in voltage regulators and governors responding to the changes. Any number of
further actions may take place where the system either stabilises at a new oper-
ating point or causes a cascading outage leading to total black-out.
3.6 Frequency Stability
This is the ability of the system to keep an acceptable frequency following a
disturbance. It is essentially an issue of maintaining generator load balance and
indeed a lack of generation reserve is often a factor in frequency instability. It
can become a factor if a poorly coupled system becomes islanded ; one island may
not have sufficient reserve to cope with generation causing an unacceptable drop
in frequency.
3.7 Voltage Stability
Voltage stability refers to the ability for each busbar on the system to maintain
an acceptable voltage. It is essentially a local phenomena which can lead to
widespread impact. It is mainly due to an inability for the power system to meet
the demand for reactive power. In fact, a system with an unstable voltage is
defines as one where a busbar whose voltage decreases as reactive power increases
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[59]. Voltage collapse is a severe drop in voltage across an area.
3.8 Rotor Angle Stability
This is the ability of generators to remain synchronised following a fault. A fault
will cause a change in the electrical torque leading to a change in speed of the rotor
in the generators. If great enough some generators may then lose synchronism
or pole-slip. In the same way that a generator that has lost synchronism will be
disconnected by its protection system, a group of generators can become islanded
if they are no longer in-step with the rest.
It is usefully to categorise rotor angle stability by the type of disturbance.
Small disturbances relate to small signal angle stability and large refer to transient
stability. Any increase in speed of one generator will cause an increase in electrical
torque on the generator and a subsequent decrease in electrical torque of the
surrounding generators. In turn, this causes the other generators to increase in
speed and the original one to slow down. If at any point the difference in rotor
angle becomes too great the rotor will skip a rotation causing huge strain on the
components - this is known as a pole-slip. The protection system of a generator
will attempt to disconnect it before this occurs.
The strength of the force that keeps generators rotating together is known as
synchronising torque. If there is not enough synchronising torque a generators
rotor angle can gradually drift away from the rest. This is known an aperiodic
drift and can be seen in Fig 3-2. It has been largely negated by a piece of control
electronics known as an automatic voltage regulator (AVR), the AVR increases
the synchronising torque such that aperiodic drift should not occur [14].
If the synchronising torque is too strong then the perturbed generator will
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oscillate against the others like a caravan snaking as it is pulled down a motor-
way. If these oscillations are not sufficiently damped, by another piece of power
electronics known as power system stabilisers (PSS), then they will increase in
magnitude leading to oscillatory instability. Properly set controllers will have
enough damping torque to mitigate many instances of oscillatory instability.
3.8.1 Small Signal Angle Stability
Aperiodic drift, shown in Fig 3-2 as non-oscillatory instability, can be caused
by a small disturbance though this is unlikely in a system with adequate AVRs.
Therefore, small signal angle stability is generally an issue of oscillatory instability
and mitigated by providing enough damping torque through properly configured
PSS and a sufficiently well connected network. You can see in the diagram how
oscillations build up until the machine is no longer synchronous.
3.8.2 Transient Stability
The three cases shown in Fig 3-3 categorise the types of transient stability issues.
A transiently stable generator, Case 1, oscillates against the other generators
but the synchronising torque is enough to stop it initially de-synchronising and
the damping torque is strong enough to reduce the oscillations. In Case 2, the
disturbance is large enough to overcome the synchronising torque and the rotor
angle increases until synchronism is lost, this is known as first swing instability.
Case 3 has enough synchronising torque but not enough damping torque; the
fault has effectively moved the system into a small signal unstable state.
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Figure 3-2: Rotor angle response to a small disturbance [59]
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Figure 3-3: Rotor angle response to a transient disturbance [59]
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3.9 Inter-Area Oscillations
Rotor angle instability can occur with groups of generators. Often these are
connected by weak tie lines and the two areas act as single machines oscillating
against each other. This can either be small signal or can be set off by a large
disturbance. A more through review is given in [57]. This is a large and complex
problem with many contributing factors, hence it is an area of intense research.
3.10 Security Assessment
3.10.1 Dynamic Security Assessment
A transmission line that is subject to a fault will experience a dynamic transient
as the initial wave propagates down the line. This will either converge to a
final value or diverge causing further action, such as another line automatically
tripping. Dynamic security looks only at the short-term transient state of the
line whereas static security concerns itself with the steady state value.
3.10.2 Static Security Assessment
Static Security concerns the system when voltage, rotor angle and frequency
are in steady-state i.e can assumed to be constant. For this reason many of the
nuances of the fault can be missed but this is still an important factor to consider




There is a lot of confusion surrounding definitions in the area of power system
reliability and security. This chapter defines all the related terms and provides
examples related to the work carried out. It also helps define the scope of the
work. This work looks at security, hence, while adequacy is important, it is not
a central theme of this work. Finally two different types of security assessment




The future of power systems is well summarised in the work of Jamasb [52], this
includes a looks at the likely future components from a economic basis and how





• Political and Regulator Environment
Additionally the reports by such as the National Grid’s ”Operating in 2020”
[67] and Renewable Network Impact Study by Carbon Trust & DTI [30] give
a more up to date account of the expected problems in the near future. This
section briefly highlights the changes that are likely to bee seen and some of the
issues that though changes will bring.
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4.1 Power Generation
There are three main renewable resources that are likely to have significant in-
stallation in the UK: wind farms, photovoltaic power and pumped-hydro power.
Of these three wind is not only going to have the largest increase but represent
the biggest challenge to the system operator.
4.1.1 Wind Power
Wind power is likely to be the largest area of growth in installed capacity for
generation. In the UK there are a total of 274 generators over 1MW of which 76
are wind farms/turbines [15]. This ignores 527 MW of smaller wind farms.
As with conventional generation it is driven by a turbine which allows existing
knowledge to be leveraged to aid design and operation. Although each turbine
has a relatively small power output (see Fig 4-1 for the rapid growth in turbine
sizes) the total power from a wind farm can be considerable due to the number of
turbines that can be situated together. Obviously wind is unscheduleable - that
is we cannot tell the generator to produce a certain quantity of power at a given
time. This is a major change from conventional generation but in most parts of
the world the penetration of wind is too small for this to make a difference.
The introduction of this intermittent and unscheduleable resource will have
a number of effects. The impact of these effects will depend on the type, in-
stalled capacity, climate and geographic distribution of the installed turbines.
The inherent intermittency of renewable generation means that it cannot dis-
place conventional generation on a ”megawatt for megawatt” basis [93], it will
however tend to increase balancing market costs [45]. This is not currently a
large problem but as penetration increases there will need to be larger reserves
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Figure 4-1: Growth in size of wind turbines [28]
or a change in market.
It was the case that wind farms were simply not made to ride-through faults,
disconnecting until normal operation resumed. This has a detrimental effect on
the system by amplifying the consequence of any fault. They have this feature
due to the lack of reactive power control on older SCIG based turbines, in fault
conditions they would consume large amounts of reactive power, possibly leading
to voltage collapse. The effects of wind power on system dynamics are covered by
a series of papers by Slootweg and Kling including [87]. This shows how newer
DFIG cope better with faults and due to advance control electronics can have a
stabilising effect post-fault. A comprehensive review of the effects of integrating
wind by Ackermann [1] highlight the danger of cut-off in turbines:
“Wind power reductions due to the cutoff wind speed can, in extreme
situations, lead to vary large power deviations.” [1]
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These effects can be observed in the system currently but they are not at a
level to cause concern. Presently they masked by the margin of error in load
forecasting. It has been shown that in simple single machine cases or cases
where the penetration is less than 20% there is no significant impact on transient
stability. However, wind power does increase balancing market costs and will
increasingly do so as penetration levels rise. The BWEA states that operational
data from wind plants in Denmark and Germany show that the maximum power
swings within an hour never exceed about 20% of the installed wind capacity
[27].
Work has been done to try and determine the most financially efficient way of
trading wind power [10]. This includes a table of expected generation variation
between 0.5 and 4 hours after a forecast.
4.1.2 Pumped Hydro-Power
Pumped Hydro-Power is a fantastic but scarce resource. To a certain extent it
is able to be scheduled and change power output more rapidly than any other
generator of that size. In effect it can act as a highly efficient form of long-term
energy storage. Its disadvantage from a power system point of view is its limited
ability to generate for sustained periods of time and the fact that it can only be
built at certain sites. In England there are very few potential places that could
house such a generator but Wales and Scotland still have such places. Most
notably in Britain is the Severn Estuary, which if dammed could act as a huge
hydro generator and provide a significant portion of balancing power electrically
close to the UK’s load centre, London.
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4.1.3 Solar Power
Photovoltaic power is unusual in that it does not use any form of turbine to
create electricity. The process is the direct conversion of solar radiation into
electricity. It could provide significant power if situated in equatorial regions
but most demand is in the northern hemisphere so transfer of power, as well as
political issues mean this is problematic. In the UK they are not likely to be a
significant proportion of the total generation as the available resource is low.
Solar power can also come in other forms. The Stirling engine and the solar
parabolic trough use heat to power a turbine which then drives a generator as
per conventional generation. This resource is again promising but only in areas
that receive strong sunlight though most of the year.
4.1.4 Other Renewable Generation Types
There are other renewable generation options but they are unlikely to represent
a significant proportion of the plant mix and hence are not considered in this
project.
Wave power has a huge potential due to the large forces at work but an
efficient means of extracting that power is yet to be devised. The Pelamis wave
energy converter [49], in Scotland, is one of a few attempts to harness the power
of the waves. It uses a segmented snake like structure that oscillates with the
waves. If an efficient scheme for extracting power could be devised the UK would
be an ideal place to use it.
Geothermal power is driven by a steam turbine generating power by heat taken
from the earth’s core. It provides a significant proportion of power in Iceland,
though many place would not have the necessary conditions. The UK does have
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a capability for Geothermal power but it is not likely to become significant.
4.1.5 Nuclear
Unless it is defeated on the political stage nuclear is likely to see significant
growth in the future despite its shortcomings. Its disadvantages include a very
high initial cost, coupled with very long start-up and ramp rates and the complex
issue of disposal of the toxic waste created by the process. That said it provides
high power with low fuel cost and, assuming we can perfect sea water extraction
of uranium, will provide sufficient power for millions of years, billions if fusion
become viable.
4.1.6 Fossil Fuels
Until we run out of fuel it is likely that fossil fuelled generators will continue to be
used. They are, however, likely to change. This change will be either incremental
improvements or the addition of features to reduce the environmental impact.
These changes are unlikely to be significant as regards to the requirements of this
project and hence will not be considered.
4.1.7 Future of Generation
In the long-term, assuming our demand for power is constant, the only sources
that look viable for producing the bulk of our energy generation is nuclear and
desert-based solar power [62]. That is not to say they will be our only sources but
the available resource from other generators is significantly lower than nuclear
and solar. This work looks to the medium term where many fossil & nuclear
generators are assumed to still be operating with the rest being made up of large
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wind farms. The main types of generator are shown in Fig 4-2. Highlighting the
ones that are to be considered in this project.
4.2 Demand Side Management & Storage
4.2.1 Interruptable Supply
Up until now most end-users expect their power to be delivered regardless of the
situation. That is, with the exception of certain large factories, such as steel mills.
They can have an agreement with the system operator to be disconnected for a
certain price. The SO can then use this as a control action to reduce demand
in an area following a disturbance. The factory will set the price so that they
earn more money than they would have by producing goods, hence both parties
benefit. Actions of this sort are known collectively as demand side management
(DSM). DSM could be used increasingly in the future.
4.2.2 Smart Appliances
There are many more resources that could act as demand management without
inconveniencing the end users. Cooling and Heating systems account for a large
proportion of demand yet they do not need to be on constantly. If the SO had the
ability to turn off everyone’s fridges, freezers, heaters and hot water for one hour
every day there would be a great reduction in peak power leading to financial
savings as well as the ability to instantly reduce disturbances. Due to the inertia
in these systems the end user is unlikely to notice the action but should still be
reimbursed for the service they are providing to the Grid.
For this system to work there needs to be some form of control system attached
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Figure 4-2: Types of Generators
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to each device. The term for devices which have this feature is smart appliances.
In effect these smart appliances are acting like a form of storage, utilising the
stored heat in a boiler rather than a battery.
4.2.3 Electric Cars
Electric cars may become more widespread over the coming years. They allow
much higher efficiencies to be achieved as long as the Grid increases its usage
of renewable power. With them they will bring a massive increase in demand
causing extra strain on the network but also a possible practical means of large
scale storage. The cars must be charged regularly but for most of the time cars are
parked. If the operator had the authority and means to delay charging thousands
of cars for one hour the effect would be a simple means of mass energy storage.
The impact on the car owner would be the minor inconvenience of having the car
take longer to charge. The saving SO would make on not having to use expensive
generators can go to reimbursing the owner of electric cars.
4.2.4 Storage
Batteries, flywheels, and super-capacitors seem unlikely to provide the kinds of
power that will effect a system operator; they are simply not cost effective. They
have been used successfully in specific scenarios but will not be considered for
this work for this reason.
4.2.5 Future use of DSM
DSM is likely to be a large component of a future power system and it is likely
to improve security not reduce it. It does have significant barriers to entry but
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these are mostly political rather than technical. This project does not consider
DSM but further work could use the tools provided by this project to see how
the use of large scale DSM changes the reliability of a power system.
4.3 Network, Operation & Control
4.3.1 Smart-Grid
The term smart-Grid is not firmly defined but has been used to describe how
the power system will look in the future. It is really an extension of many of
the things we are already seeing in power systems: demand side management,
smart appliances, smart metering, computer automation, artificial intelligence,
and interconnection. When these come together we get an image of a huge,
highly complex system that aids the SO.
4.3.2 Artificial Intelligence
As computers become faster their use in the power system has increased. They
are used both in on-line operation for such things as auto-generation control and
SCADA as well as off-line planning studies. This trend can only be expect to
increase with the growth in size and complexity of power systems. No longer are
we in a situation where a few highly skilled individuals can intuitively optimise the
generation; modern power systems require a huge amount of computation power.
If this trend does continue the logical extension is for automation to extend to
other parts of power system control. Even partial automation of something as
complex and non-linear as a power system requires advanced artificial intelligence.
It is for this reason that artificial intelligence and power systems have been linked
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over many years [103].
4.3.3 Interconnection
Not only is the individual demand for power causing an increase in the size of
the power system but so to is the increase in interconnection. National Grid
are looking into increasing its connection into mainland Europe with links to the
Netherlands and Norway. This brings both advantages and disadvantages.
As the countries are in different time zones their peak loads are at different
times. By connecting them together the peak demand gets averaged across both
countries meaning that cheaper generators can be utilised. In the case of countries
with a high penetration of pumped hydroelectricity they can further utilise this
as storage for neighbouring countries.
Its disadvantages are twofold. Firstly, there is an increase in complexity of the
power system. If a neighbouring country experiences faults then the impact of
these will be felt by interconnected systems. As there are more total components
the likelihood of one of the components in fault increases meaning the system
will have to be more stable. It is not only post fault that the increased size may
cause problems, the two countries may experience inter-area oscillations and as
there is more than one SO involved communication becomes an added challenge.
4.3.4 Distributed Generation
The power system was designed to be top-down; generators made electricity which
was passed through the high voltage transmission network to Grid supply points
where it would enter the distribution system for use. This paradigm is slowly
changing with the advent of distributed generation; put simply the connection of
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generators at lower voltage levels. Although there is no reason why the system
cannot work like this, it is simply not how it was designed hence some are wary
of its impact.
Distributed generation can come in a few forms. It may be very small micro
generation attached to peoples homes, this includes CHP, wind turbines and
solar photovoltaics. As each element is so small it does not currently require
control from the SO but if a large percentage of the country had wind farms the
fluctuations caused by changing weather might have to be taken into account.
As it is micro generation looks to be an interesting area but of little impact
to a system operator, who will only see a reduction in demand and use of the
transmission network.
The other form of distributed generation is small commercial wind farms
connected to remote parts of the Grid. Remote Grid elements are often weak
Grid elements and the effect of generation at such a distance should be explored
but is outside the scope of this project.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter aims to provide the reader with a good understanding of the com-
ponents of a future electrical power system. These are split into three areas:
generation, demand side management, and network & operation. After looking
at these components it is decided that large scale wind farms are the most inter-
esting area of study both for their likelihood of being installed in large numbers,
and the new challenges that they will bring. Smart appliances, including electri-
cal vehicles, were identified as an interesting area of study but are beyond the




This section introduces the different options for modelling power systems: details
the parts of a dynamic simulator; discusses how to model wind power before
highlighting the changes made to the load-flow program CPF to make it suitable
for later experiments.
5.1 Simulation Types
5.1.1 Why Simulation is Needed
An accurate simulation is the best way to understand the operation of full electri-
cal power networks given their size, cost and complexity. Each component in the
system can be described mathematically by their electro-mechanical or electro-
magnetic equations. By giving a sensible initial condition, any eventuality can
be tested as long as the simulator describes the models in sufficient detail.
As performing tests on a real system is impracticable some form of simulation
must be used to determine system stability. Depending on the level of detail
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required different types of simulation can be performed. The simplest of these
is the load-flow, or power-flow. It only looks at static flows across the network
treating the machines as static power injections. Obviously this means that cer-
tain phenomena are masked including all issues of rotor angle. It is assumed that
all machines are perfectly synchronous and the frequency is exactly as desired.
Despite its shortcomings it provides valuable information on voltage and over-
loads. Indeed, if the phenomena to be examined can be seen with a load-flow
then that is the tool that should be used:
“It should be stressed that the simplest representation should always be
used, consistent with the accuracy of the information available. There
is no merit in using very complicated machine and line models when
the load and other data are only known to a limited accuracy.” [104]
A load-flow is an order of magnitude faster than the dynamic simulation,
the next most complicated simulation type. The dynamic simulation treats each
machine as a set of ODEs. These model such things as the rotor, inertia and
control electronics which provides much greater detail than a load-flow. The
ODEs can be as complex as required and vary depending on which computer
program used.
PSAT [65] is one such simulation program with the ability to do both load-
flow and dynamic simulation. Its model of a basic generator can be anywhere
between 3rd and 7th order depending on the level of complexity required.
The third type of simulation is the transient simulation. It typically oper-
ates on a very small timescale looking at electromagnetic effects. This might
include lightning over-voltage studies, and protective device testing. The most
common program for simulating transients is Electro Magnetic Transients Pro-
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Figure 5-1: Simulator Timescales
gram - Alternative Transients Program (EMPT-ATP) [36]. The timescale that
these simulation deal with is given in Fig 5-1 this is expanded in [14].
Power system simulation is not a new process. Early work by Blondel on
synchronous machines at the turn of the last century [22] paved the way for
Park’s mathematical transform from 3-phase to the conceptually and numeri-
cally simpler direct & quadrature components [74, 75]. The detail and speed
of simulations has progressed immensely with the dramatic increase in compu-
tational power. Work by researchers such as Dandeno and Kundur [50] have
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allowed simulations to show different types of instability, allowing them to be
better understood. A full system, the size of the UK, can now be simulated to
a reasonable accuracy ten times faster than real-time. A good introduction to
these simulation techniques is given by Arrillaga [7].
Transient simulation is not really suitable for the work in this thesis due to
the simulation time and the level of detail required on components It is for this
reason that it will not be included. Both dynamic and load-flow simulators will
be discussed in detail later.
In terms of introductory books on the subject of modelling power system:
Meier [102] provides a good introduction to basic power systems; Kundur [59]
gives a detailed introduction to all aspects of stability; Arrillaga [6, 7] details
the basics of different types of modelling for power systems; Brenan [23] looks in
depth at the mathematics behind work used by Arrillaga; and the IEEE Std 1110-
2002 [50] updates the work by Arrillaga focusing on real-time modelling. PSAT
[65] and PSS/E [83] are two industry standard real-time modelling programs.
5.1.2 Other Analysis Methods
Given a mathematical description of a system it should be possible to mathe-
matically determine certain properties, such as stability. These methods do not
guarantee a perfect solution as there are many ways to mathematically describe
all the components in a system as well as the inaccuracies of measuring system
parameters. The transient energy function [106] aims to calculate the synchro-
nising torque and hence determine the size of disturbance that the system can
withstand. Analytical methods are a very useful alternative to numerical simu-
lation but will not be used for this work as they are best suited to steady state
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problems on a relatively small system.
5.1.3 Components
There are only a few types of components that have to be mode led. These can
generally be grouped into generators and associated electronics, loads, and net-
work components. It may be useful to simulate the main control electronic parts
of a generator, depending on the situation. These are the AVR, governor and
the PSS as well as the actual turbine. Loads can either be static or dynamic; in
the case of dynamic loads they can be treated as an induction generator/motor.
The network components include SVC, capacitor banks, transmission lines, trans-
formers, as well as HVDC and FACTS links.
Most generators (Coal, Oil, Gas, Nuclear, CHP, Biomass, Tidal, Hydroelec-
tric) behave in a similar way from a modelling point of view, as such they can
all be treated as a generic synchronous generator, each with different settings
and power electronics. Photovoltaics are connected through a DC link remov-
ing most of the problems associated with stability, but there is still the issue of
intermittent supply. Wind turbines do behave differently. They also come in a
number of forms. They can either operate at one or more fixed speeds, or they
can vary their speed continuously with the wind. They have varying amounts of
power electronics that connect them to the Grid. Ackermann [1] provides a good
introduction to the different types of wind turbine configurations. Many of these
wind turbines are often connected together as a wind park or wind farm. This
has been shown to reduce the total fluctuations in power output over a single
turbine. A problems that may surface with wind turbines is tower-shadow. This
is caused by the drop in energy from a blade passing the tower, this drop is not
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significant on its own but if it synchronises in an entire wind farm it may cause
oscillatory instability. There has also been problems with the lack of reactive
power control of older wind turbines, this has been compensated through the use
of expensive power electronics. Further information on modelling wind power is
given in Section 5.4.
5.2 Design of a Dynamic Simulator
The most suitable type of simulator for looking at faults across a system is the
dynamic simulator. Unfortunately most dynamic simulator programs focus on
detail rather than speed. As speed is a limiting factor in the types of studies
being looked at work was undertaken to develop a simple dynamic simulator
that operates very quickly. This section contains the result of the research into
dynamic simulation.
Before completion the project was dropped as it became apparent that it
would not be possible to complete in the required time-frame. Research into
load-flow simulation indicated that it would be possible to get initial results
without the detail, and time, of a full dynamic simulation. Hence PSAT, a
Matlab toolbox, and CPF, a program written at the University of Bath as part
of their dynamic simulator were used instead.
Much of the work on this chapter is from the work done on PSSENG. PSSENG
is a dynamic simulation program developed at the University of Bath by Dale
[35], Berry [16] and Chan [32]. It is been used my many postgraduate students
at University of Bath, mainly for automated security assessment using artificial
intelligence [40, 71, 107, 12]. While it was a very fast simulator it was inflexible.
It had no capability to include wind turbines hence it was not suitable for this
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work.
A dynamic simulator is based around a numerical integrator. Each dynamic
component, such as a generator or large induction motor, is modelled as a set of
non-linear ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The result of this is passed
into the network solver which performs a load-flow. The load-flow results are
then passed back into the integrator to be solved again. This repeats until the
results from the network equation and the numerical integrator match. This gives
us out first time-step. The same process is repeated to get subsequent time-steps
after taking into account any external events. Before any of this can happen the
initial state of the machines must be worked out from the known values. This
entire process is shown in Fig 5-2. Machine ODE also require iteration to find a
valid solution. For each machine the integrable and non-integrable parts of the
ODE are separated so that simpler linear techniques can be used to solve the
applicable parts. Different simulators use different methods and improvements
but this is the most common [83, 65].
The mathematical model is broken down in a number of ways to speed up the
running of the simulation program:
• The simulation time is broken down into discreet steps, normally of the
order of 10ms. The time step can be varied such that during a fault a low
value is used for accuracy while a large one is used to increase simulation
speed.
• Each generators’ dynamics are calculated separately from the others; this
is then put into a load-flow to determine the voltages on the transmission
system.
• The system is reduced from three phase to direct & quadrature using Park’s
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Figure 5-2: Dynamic Simulator Flow Diagram
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transformation [74, 75].
• Within each generator’s calculation, the linear and non-linear elements of
the equations are solved separately. This allows the use of well established
and fast methods for solving linear equations [23].
The choice of algorithm for solving the linear part of the generator’s equa-
tions is an important one. An incorrect algorithm will produce erroneous results,
often without indication that they are wrong or it may simply take an inordinate
amount of time to solve. The problem of producing erroneous results is exacer-
bated by the fact that the controllers in power systems often contain both small
and large constants, which causes many methods for solving the equations to
become unstable, regardless of whether the system you are simulating is unstable
or not.
Systems that have both small and large constants are known as stiff systems.
Unfortunately the class of algorithms that provides the best results in terms of
accuracy/time falls foul to this problem, having to use a very small time-step to
overcome it. The small time-step means that more steps are needed to simulate
the same amount of time, hence the simulation takes longer removing the previous
advantage. One way to overcome this is to modify the equations by removing
the small time-constants. However this is not a simple task. Wheatley [46] and
Ascher [8] provide good comparisons of the different types of algorithm.
For transient stability modelling programs, such as the one being considered,
the best algorithm is a trapezoidal integration algorithm, it is a-stable, meaning
it responds well to stiff systems. By repeatedly feeding the answer back in to
the algorithm an estimate for the error can be obtained and used to alter the
step-size or iterate to improve the answer.
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There are different ways of mathematically describing a synchronous machine,
and within that there are different levels of detail that can be considered. Mi-
lano [65] gives a comparison of the different levels of detail for the voltage be-
hind sub-transient method ; Dandeno [50] gives a comparison of the more popular
flux-linkage models. Both methods can work but to ensure correct results are
obtained, a suitable level of detail within the models must be used.
5.2.1 Numerical Integration
A good numerical integrator is key to having a realistic simulator. In general a
numerical integrator takes a set of equations describing a system, along with an
initial condition, and calculates the state of the system at any point in time. In
power systems the numerical integrator is used to find the solution to the linear
components of the ODE.
The general form is where the integral (x˙n) can be calculated from the system
state (xn) and the inputs (un) for any value of time Eqn 5.1. It also requires that
the initial system states and inputs are known Eqn 5.4. The outputs (yn) are
simply a function of the states at that time: the inputs are a function of both
states and outputs.
The objective is to be able to accurately predict the outputs at any given
time given only this information [33]. Sometimes the input changes based upon
external factors but this does not change the calculation.
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x˙n = f(xn, un) (5.1)
yn = g(xn) (5.2)
un = h(xn, yn) (5.3)
x(0) = x0, u(0) = u0 (5.4)
Euler’s Method
The most basic form of numerical integration uses a linear extrapolation from
the current point using the slope known from Eqn 5.1 to provide a rather crude
estimate for the next system state. This only uses the known values of states,
input and the time step duration: h (i.e. the amount of time between two time
steps) [61].
xn+1 ≈ xn + [f(xn, un)] (5.5)
The error in each iteration is proportional to the square of the time step
duration h. This is known as the local error. Over a number of iterations the
error is proportional to the time step duration and is known as the global error
[46].
localerror ∝ O(h2) (5.6)
globalerror ∝ O(h) (5.7)
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Heun’s Method
We know that Euler’s method will always underestimate the correct value for
lines whose slope is positive over the time-step in question. We can use the ap-
proximation for the system’s states, x′n+1, can be used to make another estimate,
this time using the derivative from the new value. This will be an overestimate
and hence by averaging we get a closer approximation to the real value.




k1 = h× f(xn, un) (5.9)
k2 = h× f (xn + h, un + k1) (5.10)
Runge Kutta
This method takes the idea in the previous section further and makes multiple
predictions and averages them together. The most common of these is RK4. It
uses four weighted predictions using the derivative at each and the middle of the
time-step.
xn+1 = xn +
h
6
(k1 + 2k2 + 2k3 + k4) (5.11)























k4 = f (xn + h, un + hk3) (5.15)
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Multi-step Methods
The last three methods are all single step, that is, they all only use the current
state to work out the next one. A more accurate estimate can be made for
continuous curves if previously calculated steps are used. This will only work on
systems that have the first few time steps specified, though these could be worked
out using other methods. Other method include using higher order integrals of
the system states. A summary of numerical methods for ODEs is given in Table
5.1.
Stability
Although RK4 or multi-step methods provide great advantages in terms of speed
and accuracy, they only useful if the solution is stable. This has nothing to
do with the stability of the power system that is being modelled. Very stiff
systems require very small time steps to give a correct answer, this cancels out
any advantage gained by the superior method.
For any explicit integration method to be stable its time-step must satisfy





h < 2τ (5.17)
Certain integration methods are A-stable meaning they do not depend on the






















































































































































































































































































































integration both have this property. Small time constants are simply not visible
in the output rather than making the system unstable. As stated before the
trapezoidal integration is the best method for such problems owing to its stability.
Linear and Pseudo-Linear Systems
Linear systems allow simplifications to increase the speed of calculation. Al-
though power systems are highly non-linear they can be rewritten so that the
non-linear components form algebraic equations giving new inputs to the system.
In this way the advantage of linear systems can be utilised while only sacrificing
a higher iteration number on highly non-linear parts.
x˙n = [A]xn + [B]un (5.18)
y˙n = [C]xn (5.19)
By substituting the above equations into the trapezoidal method a simplified
form can be obtained that depends only on three constant matrices. To assist
the costly matrix inversion the decomposition of one matrix into lower and upper
triangular form can be performed. This LU decomposition, as it is known, pre-
conditions the calculated matrices. As these matrices stay constant in a power
system a huge time saving can be achieved. The process of LU decomposition
can be improved by pivoting. This changes the order of rows in the matrix to
either reduce the error or keep the matrix as sparse as possible.
This is shown in Eqn 5.20.
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xn+1 ≈ xn + h
2
[f(xn, un) + f(xn+1, un+1)] (5.20)




















A further advantage of the trapezoidal method is that it is possible to iterate








5.2.2 Optimising Run-time Speed
In addition to the method described above there are many less frequently used
techniques available to increase the execution speed of dynamic simulations.
Power systems will give rise to sparse matrices, that is most of the matrix will
be filled with zeros. This can be exploited so that only the non zero sections of the
matrices get calculated. Unfortunately other techniques can change the sparsity
of the matrices giving the technique less impact. The matrices can be partitioned
so that larger areas are sparse or even so that different computing cores can
calculate the result in parallel. There are many format for sparse matrices. After
comparing a number of them (dense, linked list, CSR, CSC, coordinate format
[82] the vector of linked lists used in PSSENG was deemed to be best owing to
the speed of both calculation and initialisation.
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The reordering required for partitioning has a tendency to make one area of
the matrix dense removing some of the aforementioned advantage. Chan [32]
worked extensively on matrix partitioning for an old version of PSSENG.
Rather than try to execute parts of the matrices in parallel a simpler method
is to separate the execution by generator. As the simulator already separates
generators for calculation and as they already have a low input and output they
are ideal for parallel execution. Managing the threads of execution would be diffi-
cult to do at the required speed but as multi-core chips are increasingly common
it could provide significant advantages.
If the generators ODE calculations are being passed to another computation
unit it would be worthwhile finding the best type of chip to use. Obviously
the calculations will work on a general purpose CPU but the type of calcula-
tions involved mean that fast floating point arithmetic is advantageous. SIMD
is an extension to x86 instruction sets in most common computers. It is made
specifically for pipelining floating point arithmetic for quick solutions.
Even more specialised is the GPU, or graphics card, is made for computer
games. It excels at just the task required for power system simulation. Only
recently have developers been able to use graphics cards for general purpose
calculations (this is known as GPGPU [34]). This would require a major rethink
due to the idiosyncrasies of the device but the advantage should be large.
As the majority of the ODE calculations are fixed throughout the life of
the simulation a possibility if to use a FPGA set for the specific system. This
programmable computer is a halfway house between hardware and software and
could be used to give huge speedups in execution at the expense of a large set-up
time.
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Another possible improvement proposed by Rod Dunn of the University of
Bath is to somehow separate the network equations by taking into account the
speed of light. As nothing can move faster than light a fault on one area of a
network has zero impact on far away components in the next time step. This
separation should mean that arbitrarily large systems could be simulated with
only a linear slowdown rather than the current exponential cost.
Finally optimisations can be done at the top most level; the entire simulation.
Edwards [40] trained an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) to recognise systems
that would become unstable using only the first second of a dynamic simulation.
That system decided if the system was definitely stable, the rest had a full 30
seconds of dynamic simulation to see the actual result. This filtered out the need
for a huge number of simulations to be run and gave time for a simple SCOPF
based upon a Genetic Algorithm (GA) to be run.
If many simulations need to be run on the same basic system then the problem
is trivially parallelizable. Each simulation can be added to a queue to tasks.
When a computer is free it simply grabs the next task off the queue. If there
is a change that the exact system state will be asked to simulate repeatedly the
result can be saved in a database rather than calculated again. This is called
memoization.
As with any optimisation careful profiling is necessary to determine if the
proposed changes are worth the effort. At the rate computing power is increasing
these methods, while advantageous, may fall short of the more pragmatic method




“The object of load-flow calculations is to determine the steady-state
operating characteristics of the power generation/transmission sys-
tem for a given set of busbar loads. . . The solution is expected to pro-
vide information of voltage magnitudes and angles, active and re-
active power flows in the individual transmission units, losses and
the reactive power generated or absorbed at voltage-controlled bus-
bars. . . constraints make the problem non-linear and the numerical so-
lution must therefore be iterative in nature.” [6]
A load-flow is one of the most common forms of simulation owing to its
simplicity and speed. To perform a load-flow we require knowledge of certain
parameters on each busbar. There are three types of busbar depending on the
components attached:
1. PV - Voltage controlled busbar - Generator. Assumes P & V held constant
by power electronics.
2. PQ - Von-voltage controlled busbar - Load. Assumes that P & Q is not
affected by small voltage changes.
3. V θ - Slack (swing) busbar. Corresponds to the one busbar that does fre-
quency control.
The PV busbar represents a generator where we assume governor action holds
the real power P at a given value, hence it is specified and an AVR fixes the
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voltage in the same way. A PQ is used for busbars without control from an
AVR. These are mainly load centres without an accompanying generator, hence
the complex power is known. It is assumed that the power will not be affected by
small changes in voltage, a reasonable simplifying assumption in most instances.
One busbar is needed to take up the slack as the load-flow requires matched
generator-demand balance and the line losses are unknown. This slack busbar
has its voltage fully specified in both phase and magnitude. In most instances a
phase balanced operation is assumed hence only one phase is modelled but it is
possible to have a three-phase load-flow [7].
Initial conditions are supplied to start the iterative equation assuming that
the phase is zero and voltage is one for busbars where it is not known. The
iteration continues until the mismatch between power and/or voltage is below a
certain threshold.
A power-flow calculates complex power flow and losses on each power line as
well as the following data for every busbar on the system:
1. P – Real (active) power
2. Q – Reactive (quadrature) power
3. V – Voltage magnitude
4. θ – Voltage phase angle
A load-flow is an invaluable tool but it has its limitations. Most of these come
from its inability to simulate dynamics which results in many stability effects
being masked. It also has limits on its ability to accurately show the steady state
effect of large disturbances.
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A load-flow can be used in conjunction with a dynamic simulation to partly
overcome these limitations . A dynamic simulation can determine a set of load-
flow conditions that cause problematic transient phenomena. These conditions
form constraints that can be used with a load-flow to detect possible stability
issues that it normally would not be capable of detecting.
A dynamic simulation and a real system will respond to a line outage in a
complex way, whereas a load-flow can only compensate for the change by either
changing the reactive power profile or changing the power of the slack bus. Be-
cause of this, a poorly designed load-flow simulation can become more a test of
the capabilities of a slack busbar rather than the system as a whole.
Every generator will experience a slight change in power following a line fault
on a real system. This relationship is non-linear but depends on network topology,
prime mover inertia and generator droop characteristics.
A distributed slack busbar compensates for this shortcoming in the load-flow
by having more than one slack bus. At its logical extreme, if every busbar acts
like a slack busbar the load-flow will behave more like a dynamic simulation. It
obviously will not be able to simulate dynamics but it is more likely to end up
at a similar steady state solution.
This requires an equation stating how to split power between the slack bus-
bars. This basically is a simplified simulation of inertia, control electronics and
droop characteristics. The simplest possible way to achieve this is to assign the
mismatched power to be made up by the slack generators according to their cur-
rent power output. Pseudo-code for this mismatch fixing is given in Appendix C.
Work was done to modify CPF to allow a load-flow to more accurately deal
with faulted systems by using this special form of distributed slack bus.
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5.3.2 Optimal Power Flow (OPF)
Owing to their rapid simulation speed, load-flow programs can be embedded
inside optimisation programs. There is a variety of things that can be optimised,
as well as a variety of techniques for the optimisation [107]. PSAT includes an
optimal power flow (OPF) program which selects the lowest cost generation that
has a load-flow solution without overloads.
This kind of OPF can be seen as an incredibly simplified simulated SO in that
one of the roles of the SO is to run the cheapest generation available. The SO’s
other main operational role is to ensure security; there has been work done on
creating automatic security constrained OPF programs but there is still much to
be done in that field.
5.4 Modelling Wind Power
Wind turbine output is unscheduleable it therefore needs to be predicted unlike
conventional generation. Modelling wind farm output is a complex task. Not
only do the electromechanics of the machinery need to be considered but so to
does the weather.
There are different methods required, depending on the data available and
the type of task. If, as in the case of this thesis, an artificial system is used then
there is not going to be any real data. It is therefore a task of matching a realistic
set of data onto the system.
In a real system there is likely to be some form of historic wind speed database.
These speeds can be taken at face value but it is unlikely that there will be a large
data-set available at the wind turbine sites themselves. Most data is from weather
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stations. The task then becomes a case of finding how different the turbine site
is to the nearest weather station. This task is known as MCP analysis (Measure
Correlate Predict) [97, 81].
Synthetic data may be preferable [94] even if a real system is used as the
basis for study. The main advantage is that synthetic data does not suffer from
a limited number of data points to draw upon – more samples can be taken at
will.
5.4.1 Wind Speeds
The wind speeds are chaotic and dependent on a number of factors. They are
both spatially and temporally correlated. This spatial correlation is not just
a function of distance but is effect by terrain including valleys, vegetation and
buildings. Work by the University of Bath separated the UK into 20 zones,
further split by terrain type (lowland, highland, coastal, offshore) to ensure a
more accurate model [99].
The time correlation has many periodic cycles, most notably diurnal and
seasonal effects as well as short term gusting. Weather fronts will show a change
of wind speed moving across a region over a period of time. There is even a
correlation with demand level through temperature; a low temperature will affect
wind speed as well as causing an increase in demand. This means wind speed
prediction is highly complex; luckily there are synthetic models as well as historic
data available.
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5.4.2 Wind Farms and Turbines
Aside from the wind speed the design of individual turbines as well as the wind
farm needs to be accounted for.
The altitude that wind speed is measured at a weather station is often 10m.
This is well below the hub height of a wind turbine and hence the speed needs to
be altered to reflect this. The term for the way wind speed changes at altitude
is wind sheer. This is often a significant effect especially with the hub height of
newer turbines reaching over 100m.
The layout of a wind farm will cause two significant effects. One is that there
will be wake losses caused by having many wind turbines in one area. Careful
planning can reduce this but in [77] wake losses account for an 8% reduction.
There will also be the positive effect of spatial smoothing. A wind farm will have
the effects of gusting averaged out across each turbine leading to less dramatic
changes in power when compared to single turbines. This averaging effect also
takes place across the country but this effect should automatically come out of
the wind speed model.
Early research by the author involved looking into so called ‘3p‘ effects. This
included the drop in power as each of the three blades passed the tower. On
its own the magnitude would not be great but if blades were to synchronise,
either from electromechanical effects or wind movements, the effect could be
significant. A literature review, shown in the next section, indicated that this
effect was negligible and that wind farms could be modelled as a single turbine
for system-wide studies.
There are standard equations [1] for converting a wind speed into a generator
output power for certain types of turbine and blades. There is four parts to
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Figure 5-3: Wind Power Curve [28]
this curve Fig 5-3. The first is where the wind speed is insufficient to cause any
generated power at all. Next the power ramps up almost linearly to a maximum
before reaching a cut-off where the blades are forced to stop moving to prevent
damage to the machinery.
The cut-off region is of great interest as there is a large change in power for a
very small change in wind speed. It is not hard to imagine a situation where all
wind farms are running at full capacity allowing conventional generators to be
switched off. If then wind speed was to increase across the country many wind
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farms could suddenly stop generating due to this safety cut-off. Because of this
a larger amount of spinning reserve is required.
5.4.3 Dynamics and Power Electronics
There has been much work done in the area of wind power generation modelling.
The Electrical Power Systems Group, Delft University of Technology, Netherlands
provides great detail on dynamic modelling of wind turbines, especially the work
by W. L. Kling, J.G. Slootweg, H. Polinder. The most relevant of their work is
on initialisation of wind turbine models [89], and two papers on the modelling
[90, 84] culminating in a General Model for Representing Variable Speed Wind
Turbines in Power System Dynamics Simulations [86].
Their work progresses in two directions.
1. In creating an aggregated model for wind farms [88], where it is found
that their combined model accurately reflects the detailed model they had
created before, even during fault conditions, confirmed by other studies
[31].
2. They look at the stability effects of distributed generation [80, 79, 85, 101]
and find that, due to the inability for induction generators to control re-
active power, they are a destabilising influence on the network as a whole,
whereas double fed induction generators (DFIG) are much more stable.
This is reflected in work by other Institutes which say that normal induction
generators can cause voltage sags [48], which can lead to voltage collapse, and
that double-fed induction generators are not only better than normal induction
generators, they are better than synchronous machines due to their power elec-
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tronics [100]. By having a generator that causes voltage collapse during faults
they must be tripped. This adds to the severity of the fault [43]. Luckily most
recently installed generators are of the variable speed DFIG type.
Reactive compensation can overcome the destabilising effect of fixed speed
wind turbines as shown by Palsson et al. [73] but these are expensive components.
It is also possible that power storage devices, like flywheels, could average out
fluctuations but this technology is not widely exploited and is expensive. Nick
Jenkins at Electrical Energy and Power Systems, The University of Manchester,
UK takes a higher level approach by looking at the stability aspects of large wind
farms on the transmission network [53].
The paper by Thomas Ackerman et al., at Royal Institute of Technology,
Sweden, covers many aspects of wind power security [43].
“The TSO had been unable to assess the impact of wind generation
on system stability due to the lack of suitable dynamic models.
With increasing wind capacity, the TSOs became concerned about the
impact of high levels of wind generation on system stability. The
integration of wind power has been hampered by the lack of suitable
dynamic models for use in transient stability studies.” [43]
Although they go on to say “Wind Turbines do not cause transient stability
or any dynamic oscillation issues”, they do agree that scheduling can become
problematic. “High wind power penetration levels require a rethinking of the
power system operation method because wind power cannot be scheduled with the
same certainty as conventional power plants.” In terms of variability the paper
says, “large turbines with variable speed operations tend to absorb gusts” and
short term fluctuations may become a problem when large off-shore farms are
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installed. Wind power reductions due to the cut-off can, in extreme situations
lead to very large power deviations.
Finally, they state that increasing wind power penetration usually requires
more frequent usage of long-term reserves, which would increase balancing market
prices, and that wind output may have to be curtailed for stability reasons.
5.5 Chapter Summary
There are different techniques for reasoning about a power system. This chapter
compares different methods. Two in particular, load-flow and dynamic simula-
tions, are explored in detail. This is due to the fact that simulation accuracy and
speed are vitally important to the success of the proposed work. There was ex-
tensive work done to try and create a very fast dynamic power system simulator.
This presented a few promising areas of future work. The chapter ends with a




This chapter introduces the problem of security assessment from the point of view
of a system operator (SO). After detailing the problem it goes on to compare the
traditional deterministic schemes with the less used probabilistic method.
6.1 The Role of the System Operator (SO)
The task in security control is to keep the system in the normal state. The nor-
mal state is defined as having all system variables within normal range with no
overloads; that the system operates securely and is able to withstand a contin-
gency without violating the constraints [59]. Security assessment is the analysis
of data from security monitoring. The decentralisation of power markets has
caused power systems to be driven closer to their operation limits, trading off
security for cost. The optimal way to do this trade-off is by having the most
accurate security assessment schemes available.
If a sub-optimal security assessment scheme is used it may lead to costly over-
securing in certain conditions and dangerously low security in others. This will
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mean that higher safety margins must be put on poor security schemes which
will lead to an unnecessarily high cost.
An accurate scheme should take into account both likelihood and consequence
of every possible event. In fact a security assessment scheme should accurately
represent the risk of running the system in the current state where risk is a





Where R is Risk, e is an event, L is likelihood, and C is consequence. This
equation is used in a number of fields in different ways. In event planning con-
sequence and likelihood are rated on a five point scale. In the financial industry
likelihood can be seen as a probability and consequence financial (i.e. lost income
in dollars). Power systems can also use the equation in this way alternatively con-
sequence could be treated as MW of lost load.
A further definition of security [9] gives further insight into the problem:
“Security may be defined as the probability of the system’s operating
point remaining in a viable state, given the probabilities of changes in
the system (contingencies) and its environment (weather, customer
demands, etc.).” [9]
A perfect system is infeasible in practise due to time constraints. In the UK,
system operators have only one hour to perform final balancing actions between
the FPN - the point when they are supplied with the final load/generator data,
and the point of delivery. Though the balancing market lasts only one hour, the
system operator is likely to make predictions on generator bids beforehand for
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use in preliminary calculations. Power system security is all about coping with
likely changes. Kirschen [54] provides a good overview to some of the challenges
involved.
Security cannot easily be defined in absolute terms; there are many trade-offs
to be made. The goal is to achieve an acceptable level of security, at the least cost.
To deal with the massive complexity involved in this calculation many simplifying
assumptions are made and the use of computer simulations are invaluable.
6.2 Security Assessment Schemes (SAS)
The term Security Assessment Scheme (SAS) means a set of rules that are re-
quired for a power system to be called secure. For instance N-1 is a SAS which
states that a system can be called N-1 secure if, and only if, any single com-
ponent outage still leaves the system in an acceptable state. Obviously for this
scheme to be used in practise the set of components to be considered needs to be
more accurately defined as well as the term ‘acceptable‘ in this context. SAS are
used to ensure a system remains reasonably secure. If the system fails the SAS
then further operator action must be taken to ensure it passes. This necessitates
simulation to verify the contingencies that are considered.
A SAS in the context of this work does not match wholly with reality. In
the UK the SO, National Grid, has a team of engineers creating predictions,
contingencies and constraints months in advance of delivery. The predictions
are based upon expert knowledge aided by scores of specialist programs and
simulations. These are handed down to other teams to refine and update based
upon better predictions. These form a set of likely events which are tuned, not
only to the specific system, but to the weather, time of day, and even the schedule
85
of TV. Finally, when the FPN (final physical notification) is received, only minor
tweaks should be needed to be made. Then, as power is delivered, automatic
actions as well as constant manual tuning keep the system in check.
This thesis uses a more simplified idea of security assessment. It assumes that
one program is given the task of assessing whether the state the power system is
in is acceptable. It is therefore the purpose of a security assessment scheme to
return either a pass or fail for a system in a given state. The system operator
then makes balancing actions which change the system state until it has passed
the SAS.
If the SAS reports too many operating conditions as passes then costly emer-
gency operator action will be regularly required. If it reports too little passes then
the system is being needlessly over-secured at additional cost. Therefore there
is an optimal level of security for the system, henceforth known as the security
threshold. There is a direct trade-off between security and cost, which must be
managed.
6.3 Designing Goals of a SAS







The role in designing a SAS is not only to pick the best level of security
for the system but also to make sure the SAS accurately represents the security
level. The problem arises because we cannot accurately determine the security
of a power system in a given state. The assumptions made in designing a SAS
may lead to certain conditions being over-secured and others under-secured. The
more accurately the SAS can be designed, the lower the margin of error and the
greater the financial savings.
In this context we use the definition of security given in [60] - that security
is the ability of a power system to remain stable and within operational limits
following any likely disturbance. In this way security is a function of both the
current state of the system and any changes that occur during delivery. It is for
this reason that weather can effect the security of all power systems, even ones
without renewable generation.
Given this definition it not easy to quantify the security not only due to the
number of unknowns but also due to its multi-faceted nature. For the purpose
of this discussion let us assume the security level of a power system in a given
state can be calculated as a number. Further, let us assume that we have a
large number of likely system states. A perfect security assessment scheme would
report a pass to all systems that have a security level above the security threshold
and a fail to all those below.
This can be visualised as follows: Assume that the security level of a power
system in a given state can be represented by a probability that the system will,
due to the unexpected changes during delivery, be in an unacceptable state such
as a blackout. Further, let us assume that the security threshold is set to ’less
than one blackout every 25 years’ . If there were more than this there would
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Figure 6-1: Example of a Perfect SAS
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be severe financial penalties from the regulator, less and the operator could be
paying more than is necessary to secure the system. An ideal SAS would report
a pass for all systems with a probability of blackout being less than one in 25
years. This is shown in Fig 6-1.
Fig 6-2 shows a number of different theoretical SAS marked against the same
set of system operating conditions. We can see that 6-2-a is perfectly accurate
and precise. It only ever reports a pass to those over 50. This is impossible to
achieve in practise due to time constraints.
6-2-b is equally precise but the additional passes mean it has low accuracy
and is under-secured. If this was used as a real SAS we would expect emergency
operator action to be regularly required.
6-2-c is again precise with low-accuracy but this time it is over-secure. The
downside to this option is cost. As stated for 6-2-a it is not possible to have
a perfectly precise SAS; 6-2-d shows a lower precision SAS with high accuracy.
This is more like what would be expected from a real SAS.
If we have a very low precision SAS then it would have to be altered to be
over secure. The reason for this is that only a certain frequency of interruption
will be accepted. To ensure that a low precision SAS will have this low frequency
of interruption it must have a built-in safety margin. This safety margin is costly.
In addition to the precision and accuracy of the SAS, which give rise to cost
and outage rate, there are other criteria that must be addressed. Firstly, the
results must be verifiable; that is following an incident such as cascading outages
or brown-outs it must be possible to determine who, if anyone, is at fault. The
SO has a responsibility to maintain an acceptable reliability and if it had used



















held accountable. But as stated above there is an optimum level of security and
therefore an optimal number of cascading outages, brown-outs and loss of load.
If the SAS is deemed adequate and was followed correctly then a certain number
of faults should be expected as part of the benefit of having cheaper electricity.
A further requirement is that it does not disadvantage any particular gen-
erator and ideally should allow for environmentally friendly operation by rarely
curtailing renewables. It has been the case in the UK that wind generations have
had to be curtailed for stability reasons.
This must all be able to be run fast enough for the SO to make an necessary
modifications and rerun the SAS until the system is adequate.
6.4 Deterministic Power System Security
Traditionally, security assessment schemes manage this complexity by using a set
of credible contingencies. These are meant to represent all likely events with a
severe consequence – they should be events with the largest product of likelihood
and consequence. There has been significant work in determining which events
to include [9, 64, 37]. These contingencies are often different for each half-hour
delivery period and vary based upon weather and season.
The set of normal contingencies that are considered is given in [59]; a sub-set
of this is known as N-1. N-1 is a security assessment scheme that considers the
failure of one component (line, generator or transformer) at a time. In other
words, the simultaneous failure of two components is considered too unlikely to
count. There have been various modifications to N-1, including the addition of
correlated failures, such as the failure of two lines on a common right-of-way.
The UK SO does consider a sub-set of N-2 contingencies where two simultane-
91
ous failures are considered but not all possible double failures are checked. This
traditional contingency screening has worked well for many years but with the
paradigm shift in generation, that is coming in the form of local, unscheduleable
generation, it is time to review this idea.
The problem with all such N-x methods (N-1, N-2, etc.) is that they treat
likelihood in such a crude way; it assumes all contingencies to be equally likely.
Another disadvantage of any deterministic security assessment scheme is that
it can lead to problems if something outside of the expected set happens.
In the UK, the simultaneous failure of two generators was considered non-
credible; hence, after it occurred during 2008, emergency operator action was
needed. This is far from the only incident of its kind. 2003 saw more than its
fair share of major incidents with North America, Libya, London and Italy [41]
all experiencing widespread black-outs.
The credible disturbances are no longer best represented by discrete events.
The change in wind power over a one hour period is significant, spatially cor-
related and continuous. It is possible to treat wind power as a contingency by
quantisation at a large resolution into a small number of likely states. In per-
forming this method one must be careful to have enough possible wind states to
accurately represent everything that could happen.
If wind farms continue to be built at the current rate wind power will become a
major component of the UK’s plant mix. Unless the market changes this is likely
to disadvantage wind farms due to their uncertainty [26]. Some may say that
their cost will accurately reflect their difficult of incorporating such uncertainty
in a power system but there is no point in building wind turbines if they are not to
be fully utilised. Renewable power should be encouraged from an environmental
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point of view. However the technical challenges must be overcome. In reality
the likelihood is that the wind resource as a whole will not fluctuate drastically,
especially if turbines are distributed over a large geographical area. But the risk
must be quantified and verifiable before new security assessment methods can be
implemented.
6.5 Probabilistic Power System Security
Risk-based, probabilistic, security assessment uses probability much more di-
rectly. It is not a new idea, it has been used in other industries since the 1960’s;
and has been studied in power systems since the 1970’s [76]. But it is com-
putationally expensive and often harder to produce a verifiable result. As the
disadvantages of deterministic methods impacts financially, the focus has begun
to turn towards probabilistic methods [64, 54]. This is already happening as
balancing market prices have been driven up by wind power [26].
Sobajic et. al. [91] provides a brief overview of four different approaches to
the problem of stability assessment. The paper then discusses one such pattern
recognition method after highlighting the works of Patton, Billinton, and Wu as
contributing significantly to probabilistic methods.
After an extensive literature review, including the mention of Monte Carlo
methods, McCalley [63] goes on to determine a set of deterministic rules based
upon risk-based methods.
Monte Carlo methods are a type of algorithm used commonly in risk assess-
ment where a system with uncertainty is repeatedly sampled. In this way Monte
Carlo Methods lend themselves well to the task of probabilistic risk assessment. A
comparison of different modifications to standard Monte Carlo Methods is given
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in [13], there a financial value is placed upon outages to give an absolute level of
comparison.
For an up-to-date review of the work in risk-based security assessment see
[56]. It also provides a good conceptual representation which shows how risk-
based security assessment will more accurately reflect the actual level of security.
Xiao [105] shows graphically how traditional SCOPF can produce a more risky
solution due to its fixed constraints.
By assigning a severity to each type of disturbance Ni [70] created a system
for aiding control room decisions based on risk.
6.6 Limitations of N-1 Security
The list of contingencies to be simulated has traditionally been where each line,
transformer, and generator are individually taken out of service [56]. This gener-
ates a set known as N-1, where N represents the number of system components;
to be N-1 secure is to have a system which remains stable after any N-1 contin-
gency occurs. The UK operates somewhere between N-1 and N-2 security (the
set of all possible failures on any two components); that is, any single component
fault and credible double fault should not cause the system to enter an emergency
state.
In this way N-x security treats the probability of failure in a simplistic way;
it assumes all contingencies to be equally likely. It fails to recognise that inter-
mittent non-scheduleable generators have a quite inaccurate prediction of their
output power [10]. It also fails to take into account correlated failure caused by
common right of way, common structure or extreme weather conditions.
Additionally, the set of credible disturbances is no longer discrete. This means
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the contingency analysis itself is losing some of its past merit. In the case of wind
generation the output is stochastically variable, by treating it as a contingency
you ignore the fact that the output can vary continuously between its rated capac-
ity and zero power output. Using traditional security assessment will increasingly
disadvantage renewable generation as penetration grows [29]. The treatment of
variable load or supply under N-1 would be one of three cases:
1. It is treated as an insignificant variation and hence taken at its expected
value. This is how variation in load is currently treated.
2. The worst case of possible values is used for testing against each contin-
gency. For wind this would be either no output or maximum output.
3. The variation is treated as a separate contingency, meaning it would not
be tested in conjunction with other faults.
To treat the curtailment of wind power as a separate contingency means
that it will not be considered in conjunction with other faults in a N-1 security
analysis, this will cause an over estimation of system security. Whereas, if it is
treated as a unknown variable and hence put at its worst case, i.e. either full or no
power generation, then wind will be the cause of an under estimation in system
stability. For an individual generator there is only a 29% chance that the output
will remain within 5% of what it currently is; but there is an almost negligible
chance of it changing across its entire installed capacity. For this reason wind
cannot be treated as an insignificant variation.
In reality there is a certain probability that the output will be at any particular
value. This probability density function can be constructed from historic wind
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data. These have to be considered with each contingency. For instance the
stability must be assessed while the wind is doing X with contingency Y.
6.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter sets out exactly what is required in a security assessment scheme.
It then performs a thorough literature review of security assessment focusing
on comparisons between deterministic and probabilistic methods. This leads to
an analysis that forms the basis of the novel work presented in later chapters.




Criteria for Security Assessment
Schemes
This chapter covers how security assessment schemes are assessed and compared
then proceeds to detail the creation of a new method for comparing security
assessment schemes. Finally, results are presented showing the novel method in
action.
The work is based around a two stage Monte Carlo Sampler which uses a
load-flow simulation of the IEEE-RTS Area 1. The first stage generates scenarios,
representing possible states the power system could be in. The second stage is
used to create the probability that each of the scenarios from the first stage are
acceptable. In this context acceptable means that no emergency operator action
is required during the half-hour delivery period. This data is then tabulated to
form an overall picture of how secure the system is in a number of cases. This
can be useful in its own right but it can be further used to compare security



























7.1 Method of Comparison
Although there is significant work on different types of security assessment scheme
and how well they perform there is relatively little work performing a direct
comparison between two such schemes.
Lets say we have a SAS such as N-1. In other words the system is said
to pass N-1 if the failure of any one component does not leave the system in
an unacceptable state. We can test N-1 against each of our many operating
conditions and see if it passes or fails. This can be shown graphically as in Img 6-
2 above. We can take a number of factors from the results that this gives us.
Firstly we known for this specific set of operating conditions how many times our
SAS under test differs from the perfect SAS described above. Obviously we want
a low number of cases where they are in error.
We can also see whether the operating conditions that were in disagreement
were false-positives or false-negatives. A false positive means a pass on the left of
the security threshold; this is a system more likely to cause a problem than has
been planned for. It is an under secure system. A false negative, a fail to the right
of the threshold, represents an over secure system. It is likely that a SO would
consider a false positive (under-secure) worse than a false negative (over-secure).
By looking at the specific operating conditions that were in disagreement it
may be possible to determine whether the SAS is lacking in some respects. It
may, for instance, misrepresent only systems where the wind variability is high.
We can also gather information by looking at the difference between each of
the points in disagreement and the threshold. This gives an indication of how
badly the SAS performs when errors do occur. If a very insecure system, where
a blackout has a one in a thousand change of occurring, is reported as a success
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by a SAS then this is a larger problem than one with a chance of one in ten
thousand. In other words it would be a very poor SAS if it reported that a few
very insecure scenarios were actually acceptable.
If we allow such a system to run in that state then we are open to the financial
cost of whatever stability or limit violations that occur. We can sum up the
difference between each operating condition in disagreement and the threshold
to come up with a value for the severity of error in the SAS. It should be noted
that this number is not meant to represent anything in reality but is simply an
indication of how well the SAS is for those operating conditions tested on that
specific system. It can however be compared to another SAS run over the same
operating conditions on the same system, to see which is best.
7.2 Monte Carlo Sampling
Monte Carlo Sampling (MCS) is simply the term given to the random sampling of
events by their probability. If enough samples are taken properties of the under-
line system can be understood. The alternative to MCS is analytical techniques
these, rather then performing sampling, use the probability data itself to gain
knowledge of the underlining system.
For instance if we want to know the probability of a fair coin landing on
heads three times in a row we can either use the analytical technique which
simply gives 0.53 = 0.125 or we can perform MCS. For this a computer program
would be set up so that a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) produces
uniformly distributed numbers between 0 and 1. If the random number is above
0.5 the result is a head, otherwise it is a tail. After performing many samples
we can see how many had three heads in a row as a percentage of the total.
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This should approximately match the analytical value but as MCS is a random
approximation it cannot be expected to get the result perfectly.
Obviously in this example the analytical technique is far simpler but in other
applications, such as the one needed for this thesis, analytical techniques become
more complicated than MCS. To cope with that complexity large simplifications
must be made in the analytical techniques meaning that for complex problems
MCS is preferable.
The only caveat for creating a good MCS program is to ensure that the PRNG
is suitable. Many programming languages come with random number functions
by default but often these are not suitable for MCS. Pudaruth [77] provides a
good comparison of random number generators. He concluded that the Mersenne
Twister is the best suited, having both fast execution speed and a colossal period.
Further discussion on the generation of random numbers is covered in the classic
computer science monograph The Art of Computer Programming [58].
The work detailed later was created in Python which used the Mersenne
Twister as its default PRNG:
“Almost all module functions depend on the basic function random(),
which generates a random float uniformly in the semi-open range
[0.0, 1.0). Python uses the Mersenne Twister as the core genera-
tor. It produces 53-bit precision floats and has a period of 219937 − 1.
The underlying implementation in C is both fast and thread-safe. The
Mersenne Twister is one of the most extensively tested random num-
ber generators in existence. However, being completely deterministic,
it is not suitable for all purposes, and is completely unsuitable for
cryptographic purposes.” [78]
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There are two ways MCS can be used: sequential and random. Sequential
sampling builds up a time history of events through sampling whereas random
MCS takes independent samples with no time history. Both are equally accurate
and must be chosen on their other merits. Due to its faster execution random
MCS should be chosen unless a time history is required.
One case where sequential MCS is preferable, as highlighted in [19], is the
modelling of pumped hydro storage. The current stored water depends on the
power generated in previous samples, hence is best modelled sequentially. This
is true of any component with storage that lasts longer than the period of one
sample. It may be possible to model the level of storage as a partly random
parameter if sequential analysis had shown that it would be accurate enough. In
that way even pumped hydro storage could be modelled by random MCS but the
extra work, as well as loss of accuracy, means that is rarely done.
Another case where sequential sampling may be required is if the failure rate
of a component depends on when it last failed. This is best modelled sequentially
because of the time history but if analysis has shown it would be acceptable this
could be converted for use in random MCS.
Random sampling is used for the work in this thesis as there are no compo-
nents that have a significant time dependency.
7.3 Modelling of Monte Carlo Parameters
For a Monte Carlo Sampling program to work well it must have good input
probabilities. This sections details some of the possible factors that could be
taken into account when creating a MCS program for this purpose.
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7.3.1 Wind Power Forecasting
This has been discussed previously in Section 5.4. The simplest method of adding
wind into the IEEE-RTS is to fit an existing historic model, such as the UK data
available from the MET Office, over the geographic topology given in [47]. A
more accurate method would be to create a synthetic model which would allow
many more samples to be taken without repeating.
7.3.2 Wind Forecast Error
If historic data was used for forecast, then finding the forecast error is simply a
case of taking the difference between two successive samples. Persistence fore-
casting is the name given to the assumption that the wind will stay the same
over the time period. At such a short timescale, persistence forecasting is not far
behind numerical weather prediction (NWP) methods and is far simpler.
If synthetic wind data was used, then a method such as the one proposed in
[10] could be used. This creates a statistical model of the change in wind speed.
Table 7.1 is taken from that paper and shows how likely it is that wind power
will deviate from it’s current value. The report ‘Operating in 2020’ by National
Grid [67] shows that there is a correlation between time of day and wind forecast
error, though this may be more due to the difference in load level at those times.
7.3.3 Load Forecasting & Load Forecast Error
At its minimum the load forecast should have diurnal, weekly, and seasonal cy-
cles. The model in the IEEE-RTS covers all these. There are likely to be much
more accurate models available but the supplied data is suitable for the studies
required.
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Table 7.1: Probability of Various Expected Energy Generation with Increasing
Forecast Delay [10]
Forecast Delay (hours)
Expected Energy 0.5h 1h 1.5h 2h 2.5h 3h 3.5h 4h
0.00-0.05 - - - 1 2 2 2 3
0.05-0.15 - 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
0.15-0.25 2 4 5 6 6 6 10 10
0.25-0.35 7 10 12 13 13 14 14 13
0.35-0.45 24 22 20 19 18 16 14 14
0.45-0.55 40 29 25 20 19 19 18 17
0.55-0.65 21 19 17 16 15 14 12 12
0.65-0.75 21 19 17 16 15 14 12 12
0.75-0.85 5 10 10 11 11 9 11 10
0.85-0.95 1 4 5 5 6 6 7 7
0.95-1.05 - - - 1 1 1 2 2
7.3.4 Component Outages, Maintenance and Correlated
Failures
Component outages can be modelling in many ways, the simplest of which is
based around the mean-time-to-fail (MTTF) and mean-time-to-restore (MTTR).
Often a two state model is made where separate MTTF and MTTR values are
given for good and adverse weather. Line faults are more common during adverse
weather hence using separate values is more realistic.
There is also correlated failures to consider. If a single external event can
cause the loss of more than one component then this should be considered. One
example of this is where two separate transmission lines are located on the same
physical tower. Damage to one line can cause damage to the other.
Maintenance is a more complex issue. A generator will only be scheduled
for maintenance if it will not cause a problem. This in itself requires extensive
testing hence is not included in this work.
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7.4 Method
7.4.1 Stage 1: Scenario Generation
Stage one is the creation of scenarios. These scenarios are meant to represent a
snapshot of a power system at a given time. They are therefore based upon:
• Date and Time
• Weather Forecast
• Components on outage (either for planned maintenance or a previous un-
planned outage that is yet to be repaired)
• Demand forecast
• Output power forecast of renewable generation
• The effects of sympathetic tripping
• Bid and offer prices for all scheduleable generators
These are complex and interdependent, hence simplifying assumptions must
be made. Once the above data is gathered, it must be processed to turn it into
a testable power system simulation. To do this requires a simulated SO as well
as some form of SAS.
Unfortunately, the SAS that is being tested by the entire process can not be
used in this stage. Luckily, it is not necessary to have a very good SAS; in fact
the method requires a range of security levels, including some that have very poor
security, hence it would be advantageous if certain scenarios were better secured
than others.
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One form of simplified SO that could be used is an OPF that optimises gen-
erator cost while maintaining a system that has no overloaded components.
This simulated SO will need to be tweaked to produce a suitable range of
outputs.
7.4.2 Stage 2: Contingency Generation
The second stage takes each scenario through another round of Monte Carlo
Sampling. This time it samples for unplanned changes, these include:
• Load forecast error
• Weather forecast error, hence generator power mismatch
• Component faults during current operation period (of 0.5 hour)
The purpose of this stage is to see what realistically might happen to a power
system in such a state. By simulating each of these samples we can obtain a
measure of how likely it is that the given scenario will need emergency operator
action and hence one measure of security level.
The simulation of the second stage is less involved than the first. Because we
are looking for systems where emergency operator action is not needed we do not
have to simulate a SO for this stage. This means only automatic actions need to
be modelled. The ideal method is to do a full dynamic simulation.
As millions of simulations are likely to be required either distributed com-
puting or a change to the simulator will be required. A load-flow simulation is
an order of magnitude faster than a dynamic simulation but does not have the
ability to model outages and mismatches in the same way.
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Once the simulations are performed and acceptable systems are marked as
such we can then move on to the analysis stage.
7.4.3 Stage 3: Analysis
The analysis phase takes the results from the first two stages and determines the
best SAS. It does this using the method described in Section 6.3 and Section 7.1
but it will be paraphrased here.
Each scenario is tested with each SAS to find whether they pass or fail. A
security threshold is determined by policy where a perfect SAS would pass all
scenarios one side of the threshold and fail the others. The SAS that has the
most results in agreement with this theoretical perfect SAS is determined to be
better for the tested power system under the specified scenarios.
7.4.4 Determining the Security Threshold
The security threshold is an important factor in the success of the proposed
scheme. More work needs to be done to determine the actual tolerable level of
security as it is defined by the method above.
To find the ideal level of the threshold a cost benefit analysis could be per-
formed. There has been work done on finding the cost of security [13, 55] and
this can be used to determine the optimum level. In other words, if the security
level was set at X what would be the direct cost and what would be the cost of
emergency action and disturbances.
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7.5 Limitations and Applications
7.5.1 Limitations
As with any method this one suffers from limitations. These should not be seen
as detracting from the central point of the thesis, namely that by using a Monte
Carlo simulation we can learn a lot about the security of a power system and
by using these results we can compare how different SAS will fare. Instead the
limitations should be taken as further work or a set of considerations which must
be checked if this method is to be taken forward.
1. There is a significant data requirement. Some power systems will not have
sufficient data to create the Monte Carlo model.
2. There is a significant computational requirement. Many millions of power
system simulations are required.
3. Counting unlikely events means things that were not included in the Monte
Carlo could have a greater affect.
4. The method does not distinguish between severity of failure. Both a small
overload on a line and a system-wide black-out are considered the same.
5. The proposed method requires a simulated system operator. This is very
difficult to accurately achieve.
6. The security threshold needs to be specified but as yet it is an unknown
quantity. A poorly chosen value could have severe consequences.
7. Any non-deterministic simulation has a chance of giving misleading results
through insufficient samples.
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8. This method does not aim to make general claims about the ability of
different security assessment schemes.
1. Data
Failure rates of components, even in such a simple form as MTTF & MTTR, are
not readily available yet are required for this method to work. System operators
do not supply such data but if it were available it would be interesting to perform a
study on a real system where system operators already have first hand experience
on the quality of their SAS.
Because of the large number of samples that are used the accuracy of the input
data will have a massive effect on the result. Real failure rates are correlated with
weather, usage and component age. It would be interesting to see how much of
a difference a more detailed failure model would have no the results but it is
outside the scope of this work.
Wind speed data is often available in some form but is rarely as required.
Missing entries are common but the least of the problem. Historic wind data is
rarely available at the specific sites where wind farms are built. The main tool
for assessing the wind resource at a site is ”measure, correlate, predict” (MCP)
analysis [96]. This involves matching a short-term sample of wind data from the
site to longer term data nearby. But this method is fraught with inaccuracy as
the article states. Sensitivity to the shape of the landscape as well as nearby
forests and the change in wind speed with altitude (the height of the wind hub)
mean that there may be little correlation. Techniques do exist to mitigate some
of these issues including using NWP (numerical weather prediction methods)
or ANN (artificial neural networks) to effectively fill in the gaps in the data.
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Figure 7-2: Wind Turbine Hub Heights [28]
Weather stations take the wind at a relatively low altitude, the calculations for
’wind shear’ aim to account for the difference but these can be far from accurate
and even a change of four kph results in a 15% change in turbine output. This
resulted from an altitude change of 50 meters but modern turbines can have a hub
height of over 100 meters (see Figure 7-2). The new estimates for wind resource
by National Renewable Energy Laboratory [68] are three times what previous
studies have estimated based upon these new larger, taller wind turbines.
All this means that although wind data may be available, converting it into a
form that can be used for taking millions of samples is not simple. There is work
at the University of Edinburgh under the EPSRC SuperGen project (see http:
//www.see.ed.ac.uk/research/IES/supergen) to develop a computer program
that generates a sample-able set of data given the historic power of the area. This
would be a perfect compliment for the work here as even 20 years of data, which
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is available from many sites in the UK, is not enough if we realise that we have
to sample by day or year and hour of day. This leaves only 20 samples. This
limitation could be partly mitigated by quantisation at larger intervals. By taking
the months or even quarters of a year and splitting the day into three hours rather
than single hour blocks we have many more samples available to select from.
2. Computing Power
Although the work has not been done to determine the minimum number of
simulations required it is expected to be in the millions. This is a very large
computational load. Reducing the samples at either stage will introduce errors
and therefore is not an option. Luckily time is not a main factor in the proposed
method. Unlike a SAS itself the method for comparing them is only limited by
patience. A SAS must be quick enough for a SO to make balancing changes then
re-run the SAS until the result is satisfactory. The comparison procedure does
not need to be regularly run hence it can be left to process for many weeks if
necessary.
As each sample is independent the problem is trivially parallelizable. A block
of samples can be sent off to a computer for it to process and the result sent
back when it is done. The very small input and output required by each sample
combined with its high computation cost means it is a perfect application for
parallel execution.
A second speed-up can be obtained by memoization combined with careful
quantisation of the Monte Carlo outputs. Many of the samples will be the same
to a certain degree of accuracy. Initial results show that some 98% of all stage
2 samples do not have any failed components. In addition, there are less than a
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hundred values of load forecast meaning that 98% of all stage 2 samples can be
calculated in 100 simulations regardless of how many actual samples are required.
The introduction of wind variation makes this effect less pronounced but it is still
an important factor in reducing the computation load.
Finally the choice of simulator is also relevant. A load-flow will simply not
represent certain stability issues but is far faster than the more detailed dynamic
simulation. As previously discussed, modifications can be done to the load-flow
which will allow it to give a more realistic result.
3. The Long Tail
The objective is to find a SAS that is better that N-1 hence, the most important
Stage 2 samples are the ones that have either multiple outages or large forecast
errors. This means the important samples are from very unlikely events. The less
likely the event the more a small change in input probability or input distribution
will affect it.
There comes a point where accuracy of data is more important than number
of samples. This can be tested by sensitivity analysis. By changing the inputs
slightly, one at a time, we can see how they effect the final result. If any data
causes a massive change in results from a small change input then we must be
sure that we have the most accurate possible measure of that data. This further
goes to highlight the importance of having accurate data.
4. Severity
The method shown makes no distinction between an overloaded line and total
system black-out. They are both marked as unacceptable. In reality, temporary
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small overload is not an issue. Certain other states that are unacceptable may
be trivial to fix requiring only straightforward operation action.
Ideally we consider the operator action required to stabilise the system. This
could be in the form of the amount of power that has to be shed [55]. This adds
another layer of complexity to an already complex method and is not considered
here but is a very useful addition. If the modification were made it would not be
trivial to add it to the rest of the stages.
The idea of a single stability value would have to be rejected in exchange for
a probability that the required load to be shed is less than X. This probability
density function would make further calculations more difficult as well as the
problem of interpreting the results but it would be a great advantage to the
system.
5. Simulated System Operator
A system operator (SO) is not an individual, it is a company with a team of
people planning years ahead and refining those plans to create specific knowledge
about how the system will run. All this cannot be replaced by a simple computer
program. There is simply too many unknowns.
As we must accept this situation then we must realise that we are limited by
the accuracy at which we choose to model the SO. An overly simplified SO will
lead to unrealistic scenarios. Luckily we do not need a greatly accurate SO. We
want the system to fail in certain instances as we want to compare the number of
times a system is unacceptable. This means a large part of a system operator’s
action, namely the on-line action, can be greatly reduced or removed entirely.
Even if we could simply all operator action down to a computer program it
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could not be used here. We cannot use a specific SAS as part of the method
when testing that SAS. If all scenarios were secured to N-1, then in the analysis
phase all scenarios would pass N-1 by definition. This means we would not have
any failure data with which to compare the effectiveness of different results. It
is possible that wind forecast errors alone could create problems leading to failed
scenarios but it would be far more effective if there were a wide range of security
levels.
That said the less the simulated SO represents reality, the less applicable
the results are. Remembering that the SAS will be applied to both unsecured
systems and secured ones leads us to the idea that some of the scenarios should
be secured and others simply stable.
6. The Security Threshold
The security threshold is the minimum level of security that we can have which
we want to pass our perfect SAS. Although the idea has existed before, here it is
used as a concrete value. It is vital to the success of the scheme that this value
is chosen correctly. There is no research available on the optimal value for the
security threshold because it has not been used in this way before. This work
does not aim to address it.
7. Statistical Anomaly
As with any non-deterministic simulation this one also has a chance of giving
misleading results through insufficient samples.
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8. Limits of Claims
This method does not aim to make general claims about the ability of different
security assessment schemes.
7.5.2 Applications
This method gives us one measure of security of a number of possible scenarios.
From this a number of useful applications can be envisaged. Secondly, the method
creates a database of likely consequences of certain system states. Below is a few
possible applications that the method could be used for. Note that some of these
will require changes and would require further testing.
1. Comparing SAS
2. Aid in developing a new SAS
3. Locating weakness in an electrical power system
4. Identifying weakness in a SAS
5. Testing the effect of network changes on security
1. Comparing SAS
As described above we can use the idea of a perfect SAS to find the number of
mismatched results in two sets of data.
2. Aid in developing a new SAS
Once we have data from the analysis phase of the proposed method we can quickly
test modifications to a SAS. This allows improvements to be made quickly. If
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weakness are found then the SAS can be modified to overcome these.
If we had infinite computational power we could simply run stage 2 as a SAS.
It would come up with the probability that the current system state will lead
to an unacceptable system. Sadly we are far from having enough computational
power to do a representative Monte Carlo. Hence what is required is a fast SAS
that gives the same results as using stage 2 as a SAS. In other words, it is finding
a mapping between the system state and its security level.
The problem of mapping is ideal for ANN but it is yet to be seen if they can
cope with the complexity of security assessment. Human neural networks still
make mistakes more often than we would like and ANN is a long way off having
human intellect.
3. Locating weakness in an electrical power system
As it is necessary for such a large number of simulations to be performed we can
get a feel for which components are likely to cause problems. For instance, in
the RTS the underground cable may be a source of reactive power issues or there
may be certain components that are likely to lead to unacceptable systems than
others.
This set of likely problems would be a fantastic resource for operator training.
Not only are they realistic scenarios but they would be the kinds of problems likely
to occur.
4. Identifying weakness in a SAS
The results of testing can be valuable even if the decision is made to not change
the SAS . By analysing the false positive and false negatives, weakness in the
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SAS can be identified. This can either result in modification to the SAS to better
deal with those types of events or prepare the SO better to notice and react
accordingly.
5. Testing the effect of network changes on security
It may be possible to test the effect of small network changes although it is far
beyond the scope of this work. This could be done by re-running the scheme with
the same samples to see if it causes any changes in output.
7.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter covers how security assessment schemes are themselves assessed.
It then proceeds to detail the creation of a new method for comparing security





The aim of this chapter is to detail the development of a computer program
made to test and compare SAS. It is then tested using approximate analytical
calculations.
8.1 Program Data Sources
Here the sources of data used in the final program, as well as external tools, are
discussed. They are broken down into three areas:
• The Power System Network
• The Network Simulator
• The Probabilities for the Monte Carlo Sampler
8.1.1 Network - The IEEE Reliability Test System 96
The IEEE Reliability Test System 96 (IEEE-RTS) [47] is a sample power system
with a thorough set of data for operation, emissions, and reliability. It was for
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this reason that it was chosen as the test system for this work. For the bulk of the
simulation the three area version was used, which is composed of 99 generating
units, 73 busbars, 120 lines, 51 loads and two voltage levels. The network diagram
is shown in Figure 8-1.
It was not meant to be representative of any particular power system but
aimed to represent all the different technologies and requirements that could be
encountered. Because of this it has been updated to include new technologies as
the sector advances. The first version of this system was developed in 1979 [51]
it was then updated in 1986 [3] and once again in 1996 [47].
In addition to new data the system has increased in size to incorporate three
almost identical areas. As they are almost identical only the details of the com-
ponents in the first area are shown in the following tables, a full listing is given
in Appendix A.
There have been many changes to power systems in the last 14 years and it
would be good if the IEEE-RTS could be updated to incorporate these changes.
The largest of the changes is the increase in penetration of renewable generation.
As it stands the IEEE-RTS includes no renewable generators. Although the
literature is showing examples of individuals who have added wind turbines there
is no consensus or standard forming on where and how much renewable power
should be added.































Table 8.1: Line Probabilities
Line ID From To Fail Rate MTTR
A1 1 2 0.24 16
A2 1 3 0.51 10
A3 1 5 0.33 10
A4 2 4 0.39 10
A5 2 6 0.48 10
A6 3 9 0.38 10
A7 3 24 0.02 768
A8 4 9 0.36 10
A9 5 10 0.34 10
A10 6 10 0.33 35
A11 7 8 0.30 10
A12-1 *1 8 9 0.44 10
A13-2 *1 8 10 0.44 10
A14 9 11 0.02 768
A15 9 12 0.02 768
A16 10 11 0.02 768
A17 10 12 0.02 768
A18*2 11 13 0.40 11
A19 11 14 0.39 11
A20*2 12 13 0.40 11
A21 12 23 0.52 11
A22 13 23 0.49 11
A23 14 16 0.38 11
A24 15 16 0.33 11
A25-1*3 15 21 0.41 11
A25-2*3 15 21 0.41 11
A26 15 24 0.41 11
A27 16 17 0.35 11
A28 16 19 0.34 11
A29 17 18 0.32 11
A30*4 17 22 0.54 11
A31-1*5 18 21 0.35 11
A31-2*5 18 21 0.35 11
A32-1*6 19 20 0.38 11
A32-2*6 19 20 0.38 11
A33-1*7 20 23 0.34 11
A33-2*7 20 23 0.34 11
A34*4 21 22 0.45 11
* starred lines are on a common right of way with those of the
same number if one fails the other will also fail with a
probability 0.08
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Table 8.2: Generator Probabilities
Generator ID Busbar MTTF MTTR
G1 1 450 50
G2 1 450 50
G3 1 1960 40
G4 1 1960 40
G5 2 450 50
G6 2 450 50
G7 2 1960 40
G8 2 1960 40
G9 7 1200 50
G10 7 1200 50
G11 7 1200 50
G12 13 950 50
G13 13 950 50
G14 13 950 50
G15 14 -1 -1
G16 15 2940 60
G17 15 2940 60
G18 15 2940 60
G19 15 2940 60
G20 15 2940 60
G21 15 960 40
G22 16 960 40
G23 18 1100 150
G24 21 1100 150
G25 22 1980 20
G26 22 1980 20
G27 22 1980 20
G28 22 1980 20
G29 22 1980 20
G30 22 1980 20
G31 23 960 40
G32 23 960 40
G33 23 1150 100
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8.1.2 Load-flow Simulator - CPF
A detailed discussion of simulation techniques and tools in general is covered in
Chapter 5; this section discusses the specific requirements and decisions for this
particular application.
Requirements
The requirements of the simulator were as follows. It must have:
• The ability to simulate the chosen network using either a load-flow or dy-
namic simulation.
• The ability to be run from command line without user interaction.
• A fast simulation speed.
• Results that are easily analysed by another computer program.
• The ability to remove individual lines, busbars and generators. To simulate
planned outages or failures during operation.
• The ability to easily change the load level of busbars in the input file.
Niceties
In an ideal world both stages of the program would have different simulation
parameters. The first stage needs to represent a random snapshot in time of the
power system as a system operator might see it. It would be a useful extension
to the project to add an OPF to the first stage.
The second feature that was non-essential but would have improved accuracy
would be an ability to simulate in multiple stages. After the OPF of the first
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stage it would have been good to feed the results into a load flow simulator after
applying contingency changes.
PSAT
The two niceties must both be present in the same program for it to work as a
whole. A number of different simulation tools were reviewed, the closest match
was PSAT, a Matlab toolbox. Although it appeared to fit all the criteria, prob-
lems were found during testing and couldn’t be resolved. Ultimately this was
because PSAT is not meant to be used in such a way. The output file is meant
to be read by humans not a computer and as such was very difficult to parse (get
the computer to read an interpret the results).
Another significant challenge was communicating between PSAT and the
Monte Carlo Simulator which had already been written in another program-
ming language. Communicating directly with PSAT inside Matlab proved too
complex. Hence to run a simulation, the output of the Monte Carlo Sampler is
saved to disk. Matlab is run as an external program using those stored results
as it’s input. This process, although complex and slow worked. It would make
more sense to use a program that properly supported data streams to avoid the
slow hard drive access and one that was meant to be run from a command line.
Due to the very slow start-up and shutdown time of Matlab, simulations
were done in batches. For example, 100 simulations were written to file to be
processed in one go. By grouping simulations this way Matlab could process
many simulations each time it was started. This enabled the program to be
trivial to parallelise if multiple computer or multiple cores were available.
In the flow diagram (Image 8-2) the process for Stage 1 is detailed. Here it
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Figure 8-2: Flow Diagram for PSAT Stage 1 Sampling
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includes simulation but that is not necessary. In addition to the batch file it was
possible to gather statistics about the samples and simulations. These statistics
are analysed later.
The sampling program is based around four main data types, each associated
with a file type. These are created and modified with a number of scripts.
• The PsatData type is a Matlab file containing information for PSAT about
a specific scenario to be simulated. This file is used by Matlab to produce
a simulation report. The files end in .m. More information on this can be
obtained from the PSAT documentation.
• PsatReport is the report produced my Matlab after a simulation is run. It
contains power flows, losses and bus bar voltages. It is meant to be analysed
by hand and hence it requires parsing to be interpreted by a computer.
Report files end in XX.txt where XX is an incrementing number.
• NetworkProbability is a data file containing the probability of failure of
various components as well as joint failure of different components. It
creates scenarios from a network probability data file. Probability files
end in .net.
• SimulationBatch files hold a list of scenarios. Each scenario contains the
changes that have occurred such as a line outage or a change in demand.
Batch files can optionally contain simplified simulation results. Batch files
end in .bch.
Ultimately, PSAT was dropped as the power system simulator and a simpler,
faster tool was used. The software that used PSAT was never fully finished, but
a number of parts are complete and available at http:\\github.com\kerspoon\
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laos. This could be used as a starting point for further work using PSAT for
security analysis.
CPF
CPF is part of PSSENG, a Dynamic Power System Simulator developed at the
University of Bath by Dale [35], Berry [16] and Chan [32]. CPF was originally
used to work out the initial load-flow conditions before a full dynamic simulation.
As it was written as part of a dynamic simulator, the core algorithm is very
fast. It actually matched all requirements by design and was an easy fit for the
simulation.
Unlike PSAT it also had a very fast start-up time meaning the complicated
and complex batch processing, including constantly writing large files to disk,
was not needed.
There were some modifications needed. Firstly, to remove components easily
they had to be placed on their own line of the input file. These were joined
to the original bus by a line of zero impedance so as to make no difference to
the simulation results. This meant that removing a component was as simple as
deleting a few lines. No calculations were needed. Changing the load level was
relativity straight forward as each power was a single number in the file. The
modified output could be piped directly into CPF from the Python-based Monte
Carlo Simulator
For these reasons CPF was selected as the simulator for this program.
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8.1.3 System Probabilities - Monte Carlo Sampler Pro-
gram
The core of the computer program is the two-stage Monte Carlo Sampler; the
general points to consider are covered in Section 7.2. The specifics relating to
this application are detailed in this section.
Implementation
Stage one consists of sampling to generate a range of realistic operating condi-
tions. Outages of lines, busbars and generators are calculated from their mean
time to fail (MTTF) and mean time to repair (MTTR) as per Eqn 8.1. For com-
ponents that have a failure rate specified, instead of a MTTF, a simple conversion
was performed. Busbar failure rate is not included in the original paper so a value
of 0.025 was chosen to be consistent with values in the literature [2, 20, 24, 44].
Failure rate is given in failures per year and MTTF and MTTR is given in hours.
Included in the paper is the probability that the tripping of certain lines will





The second stage takes each scenario through another round of Monte Carlo
sampling; this time it samples for unplanned changes. Load forecast error is con-
sidered but only in the most basic form, a normally distributed random number
with mean 1 and s.d. 0.05 is multiplied by the forecast given in stage one.
A more realistic measure should take better account of the correlation between
time and load forecast error as well as weather impacts. Component faults are
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Figure 8-3: Demand Level per Hour of Day
taken by converting line, generator and busbar value, from the original paper,
into the probability that they will fail during the half-hour delivery period. This
calculation uses Eqn 8.2. A weather forecast is unnecessary in this part of the
work as the IEEE-RTS does not have renewable generators.
Pf = 1− e−λt (8.2)
Demand Forecast Analysis
The IEEE-RTS supplied data for demand level is based upon the season, hour
and week. This section looks at how the load level fluctuates then uses the MCS
to form aggregate data.
As can be seen in Figure 8-3 the power use is much lower during the night, it
ramps up rapidly from 5am reaching its first peak around 9am, then depending
on the specific week observed it either tails off or holds steady until the evening
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Figure 8-4: Demand Level per Week of Year
peak between 6pm and 8pm. Week 1, being the start of January, is notably
higher than other weeks due to extra energy usage for space heating and, in the
evening, lights.
The yearly changes appear much more stochastic (Figure 8-5). The most
notable trends are a much lower energy usage at weekends as well as the seasonal
variation of higher energy use in winter.
When sampled this data-set gives the probability density as shown in Image
8-5. In this graph the demand forecast has been quantised to the nearest 0.05.
Note that only a very small percentage of samples are at the full demand level
(only 603 out of one million samples in the run shown in the graph). Also note
that there is a reasonable high probability that the system will be running at
35% of its maximum. It is not unreasonable to expect wind power alone to meet
this demand level which could cause significant problems if not enough spinning
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Figure 8-5: Aggregated Load Forecast
reserve was available. As this graph shows the fraction of samples of a given
power level it also serves as a good approximation to the probability of a base-
case having the given load forecast.
The second stage of Monte Carlo Sampling took the load forecast and created
a forecast error. This was simply taken as a normal distribution. The results
of quantisation are shown in Figure 8-6. It has a relatively small effect when
compared to the forecast itself but a 10% increase in power demand is significant
both in its frequency and effect.
Outage Frequencies
The number of components that have failed or are on outage in each sample
are illustrated in Figure 8-7 and Figure 8-8. Rather unexpectedly it shows that
up to eight simultaneous component outages can occur in one million samples.
This would seriously weaken the network. There is a 77% change of at least one
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Figure 8-6: Aggregated Load Forecast Error
Figure 8-7: Component Outage (Stage 1) Frequencies
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Figure 8-8: Component Failure (Stage 2) Frequencies
component outage, hence it is much more likely that the system is not at it’s
full generating capacity. Generator failures accounted for most of these outages
with only 3% of samples having at least one line failure and only 0.1% of samples
having any busbar failures.
Components failures (Figure 8-8), tell a similar story on a much smaller scale.
These represent problems that occur to the system during delivery. This means
that in four samples out of a million, three unrelated failures all occurred within
the same half hour period. This will cause extreme stress to the system but it
is an unlikely event. Though independent samples should not be thought of as
a time series, one million half-hour samples represents a time period of about 60
years. Taken in the context that Edison set up the first ever power system about
130 years ago this million samples is bound to include some very unlikely events.
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8.2 Program Structure
The program itself was written mostly in Python and is available on-line at
http://github.com/kerspoon/kiribati.
It has a number of functions which all take input from the command line.
This allows it to be combined together easily and intermediate parts written out
to file for debugging or analysis.
Each heading below denotes a separate use of the computer program devel-
oped.
Generate Base Cases
# generate 10 unique base cases and save to file.
python main.py base-case 10 > base.csv
This option outputs a list of base-cases to the command line. The base cases
are generated using Monte Carlo Sampling as described in Section 7.2, taking in
to account MTTF, MTTR, CROW failures, and load-level.
The parameter is the number of unique base cases to output. For instance,
if this was set to 1000 there would be 1000 lines in the files, each representing
a different base-case. There would probably be some samples that have already
been included in the output and hence are not shown. If two base cases, for
example, had a bus bar level of 0.55 and only G23 on outage then it would
output a single line.
The advantage of this is that it will cause only one simulation to be run. This
has a very dramatic effect on the speed of computation with no loss of accuracy.
In one run of 256 billion samples there were only 100,000 simulations required.
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The output is a comma separated value file (CSV), meaning it can be opened
in any spreadsheet program or text editor. Here is an example output.
1, outage, None, , 0.75, G22, G23, G86, G71, G16, G65
1, outage, None, , 0.7, G62, G23, G91, C30
1, outage, None, , 0.55, G80, G99, G65
1, outage, None, , 0.5, G6
1, outage, None, , 0.65, G39, G35, G1, G90
1, outage, None, , 0.45, G84, G68, G71, G78
1, outage, None, , 0.65, G30, G5, G3, G68, G44, G66, G98
1, outage, None, , 0.5, G80, G57
Each line is one base case. The first column is the number of base-cases that
had the following result. So in the example above the line produced would be:
2, outage, None, , 0.55, G23
The second column is the type of the sample. For base-cases it is always
”outage” but it will change for contingencies or n-x runs.
The third and fourth detail the results of simulation which are not defined
until a simulation is run on the file.
The fifth column is the load level. This number is the percentage of the peak
that all loads will be scaled to. For instance, if the load for a particular bus was
6.2 before the sample was applied and the load-level was 0.5 the resulting bus
level would be 3.1, this is applied equally across the busbars.
The rest of the columns list the names of components that are not to be
included in the simulation. In base-cases this represents maintenance or previ-
ously failed components that are not available during the delivery period. In
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contingencies it represents components that will fail during the current delivery
period.
Obviously the base-cases it produces are dependent on the input files which
specify the components and probabilities. As the only power system considered
in this thesis is IEEE-RTS the file names are hard-coded into the program.
Generate Monte Carlo Contingencies
# generate 1000 unique contingencies
# using the base cases in base.csv and save to file.
python main.py contingency 1000 < base.csv > contingency.csv
This option first generates contingencies based upon the probabilistic changes
during the delivery period. It then combines the contingencies produced with the
base cases given on the standard input.
For example, if there were only two base cases given:
1, outage, None, , 0.5, G1
1, outage, None, , 1.0, G2
Then it may output something like the following:
0, base, None, , 1.0
1, failure, None, , 0.95, A1
1, failure, None, , 1.05, A2
1, outage, None, , 0.5, G1
1, combined, None, , 0.475, G1, A1
1, combined, None, , 0.525, G1, A2
1, outage, None, , 1.0, G2
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1, combined, None, , 0.95, G2, A1
1, combined, None, , 1.05, G2, A2
The output here is in sections. First is the raw base case with no changes,
then the contingencies not combined with a base-case. Next is the first base case
in the input followed by that base case combined with each contingency given
before in turn. This is repeated for all base cases. This means there will be:
x = (B+1)∗ (C+1) samples in the output file, and hence that many simulations
to perform.
Note that the same samples are used for each base case. This does not neces-
sarily represent reality but as long as there are enough samples it is not a limiting
factor to the accuracy of the results.
Just the failures are put into the output and any base-cases are ignored if the
command line option noInput is given.
Generate N-x Contingencies
# generate all single component failures
# using the base cases in base.csv and save to file.
python main.py n-x 1 < base.csv > n-1.csv
This option generates contingencies but this time they are not from Monte
Carlo. The parameter specifies the number of simultaneous outages to consider.
If the parameter is one, for example, then only single component outages are
considered. This would cause one contingency per system component. In the
IEEE-RTS this would cause 289 contingencies to be created, as there are 289
components.
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If the parameter is two using the IEEE-RTS as the input file there will be
41,616 contingencies.
Like the contingency option it combines the set of contingencies with each
base case ready for simulation.
Simulate
# generate all single component failures
# using the base cases in base.csv and save to file.
python main.py simulate < base.csv > results.csv
This takes base cases or contingencies and simulates each one in turn using
CPF. The results from each simulation are categorised as either acceptable or
unacceptable. Unacceptable means there was: divergence, islanding, or a compo-
nent out of static limits. This represents whether a system operator would have
to perform emergency action to keep the system running acceptably.
The output file is of the same format as the input, the only change is to the
third and fourth column to set the results.
The file is processed one line at a time, rather than waiting until the entire
program is complete before producing any output. This meant that if there was
a problem with the simulator it could be checked while it was still running. It
was also possible to stop the simulation part way through without losing all the
results.
It is possible to specify all steps in one go, eliminating intermediate files.
Unfortunately, this gives no feedback as to progress. It also means that all steps
have to be run again if a change is needed.
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Analyse
# summarize the results of a block of simulations
python main.py analyse < results.csv > analysis.csv
The final stage of the program takes the output from a simulation of contin-
gencies combined with base cases and condenses them down. It doesn’t matter
whether the contingencies were generated using Monte Carlo or n-x.
For each base case it counts the total number of unacceptable samples. This
gives the probability of acceptability, which is used in the final assessment.
For example if the input file was:
0, base, True, ok, 1.0
1, failure, True, ok, 0.95, A1
4, failure, True, ok, 1.05, A2
1, outage, True, ok, 0.5, G1
1, combined, True, ok, 0.475, G1, A1
4, combined, False, ok, 0.525, G1, A2
1, outage, True, ok, 1.0, G2
1, combined, False, ok, 0.95, G2, A1
4, combined, False, ok, 1.05, G2, A2
Then the analysis would produce:
0, base, True, ok, 1.0
0, 5
1, outage, True, ok, 0.5, G1
4, 5
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1, outage, True, ok, 1.0, G2
5, 5
It alternates between printing out the base-case and printing the number of
acceptable cases. Note that it does not simply count the number of lines as
certain lines represent more than one sample, as can be seen in the example.
Utilities
In addition to the main use of the program it also has two utility functions.
The command test prints out the results of simulating a number of interesting
base-cases that stress the program in different ways. It also prints the file that
is used as an input for CPF. This is a file that if normally never seen but is
useful in checking the behaviour of the program. This is to ensure that it is being
produced properly for a number of edge cases. The cases selected also make sure
that the simulator is tested on those edge cases as well.
Finally the command clear deletes all files from previous runs so that the
working directory is clear to start again.
Flow Diagram
The connection between each different use of the program is shown in Figure
8-9. For instance you can see that the results of the base case generation feeds
directly into the simulation function. The diagram shows a complete run from
the creation of bases cases down to the analysis of both N-x and Monte Carlo
contingencies. The same process is shown programatically in Section 8.4.
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Figure 8-9: Flow Diagram
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8.3 Testing
To ensure the proper operation of the program there were various tests performed.
These ranged from: quick checks of individual functions; checking simulation
output with hand worked examples; to an analysis of how many samples were
actually needed to ensure that it was not the limiting factor.
Unit Tests
The simplest of these checks are the small unit tests. These are best described
by David Thomas et al. in Pragmatic Unit Testing [5]:
“A unit test is a piece of code written by a developer which exercises a
very small, specific area of functionality in the code being tested.” [5]
While the program was being developed unit-tests were programmed to run
every time the code was run. If any change caused the unit-tests to fail the
feedback would be immediate. The extract of code below shows one of these
tests. It makes sure that the individual function quantised 01 does what is









These functions, although not individually useful in calculating anything to
do with power systems, form the building blocks that make a useful program and
the unit tests are there to make sure the foundation is solid.
Module Tests
Module tests are the next logical level up from unit tests and could probably be
considered unit tests in, and of, themselves. They test the boundaries of modules
as seen externally. This makes sure that the interaction of the modules class and
its helper functions all work together properly.
The buslevel module has two main functions exported for other modules to
use. If we ensure that these two functions work then no further testing of the
internals should be necessary. One of the functions takes as an input the week
of the year, day of the week and hour of the day to produce a single forecast
load figure. These can easily be hand worked. The first hour of the year (01/Jan
at 00:00), for example, should give a load forecast of 0.537 times the base level.
This is what is checked in the first assertion in the code below:
def test_peak_load(self):
self.assertAlmostEqual(forecast_load(0, "Monday", 0), 0.537, 3)
self.assertAlmostEqual(forecast_load(0, "Sunday", 0), 0.504, 3)
self.assertAlmostEqual(forecast_load(51, "Sunday", 23), 0.578, 3)
self.assertAlmostEqual(forecast_load(37, "Tuesday", 12), 0.646, 3)
Another example ensures that the samples which form the basis of all input
and output of the program are able to be read and printed properly. It does
this by reading in some test cases then printing then back out and checking they









1, outage, False, bad, 0.55, G49, G32, G22, G12
""")
self.util_readwrite_match("""
999, failure, True, ok, 1.0
""")
self.util_readwrite_match("""
999, combined, None, ok, 0.01, A1
""")
self.util_readwrite_match("""
1, combined, False, message here, 0.525, G31, G66
""")
Fix Power Mismatch
This is another example of a module test but is a special case as it changed the
functionality of the load-flow program used for all simulations, hence it is worth
documenting.
Load-flow programs cannot be run with any mismatch. This is by design. If
144
there is a mismatch it will be cancelled out during calculation by the slack-bus. If
there are significant mismatches, such as from the removal of certain generators, it
can lead to problems. The simulation may end up testing the ability of the slack-
bus to cope with changing power levels rather than the entire system. For this
reason the expected mismatch is averaged across all suitable generators according
to their current power levels.
The code ensures that generators power limits are observed so that if a gen-
erator was to hit a limit it is simply set at full power and the rest of the power
distributed among the other generators.
The code for this is given in Appendix C.
Certain generators are not suitable for variation. These are the ones where
power output is not controllable, for example, wind turbines. In these cases they
are taken to be of a fixed value and the rest of the generators must make up the
difference.
Sometimes the power requirement is too high to be met by the available
generation. This is a problem of adequacy and as such the particular case can
be marked as unsuitable even before a simulation is run. This did occasionally
happen during simulation but it was rare. It required either the power to be
over 15% higher than the forecast maximum or that the power was still very high
and large generating units were out of service. As this could happen in a real
power system it is not a problem with the simulation but accurately represents
a problem in the system.
The following piece of code is an example of one of the tests for the mis-
match fixing code. It checks that a mismatch is evenly split when applied to two
generators whose power equal.
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Note that it would not always be split equally. If one generator had a limit of
less than 1.5 p.u. or the initial powers of the generator differed from each other
the resulting power on each generating unit would be different.
def test_2(self):
current_power = [1, 1]
max_limits = [2, 2]
min_limits = [-2, -2]
res = fix_mismatch(1.0, current_power, max_limit, min_limit)
self.assertAlmostEqualList(res, [1.5, 1.5])
Integration Testing of Monte Carlo Simulation
The Monte Carlo simulation spanned a number of modules. It had code to read
in the input files, generate random numbers in various distributions, and output
the results. As such the testing involved is no longer known as unit tests and
becomes integration testing:
“Integration testing shows that the major subsystems that make up the
project work and play well with each other.” [4]
If the Monte Carlo simulation was working correctly it should have an output
that almost matches the theoretical results. For example, the theoretical result
of tossing a coin 1000 times would be 500 head and 500 tails. A working Monte
Carlo sampler will give results similar to this.
The exact analytical solution to the problem we are simulating is complex
involving failures that change the probability of other events occurring such as
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Table 8.3: Theoretical Results
Name No. Min Max Average
Bus Po 24 3.70× 10−005 3.70× 10−005 3.70× 10−005
Bus Pf 24 3.00× 10−006 3.00× 10−006 3.00× 10−006
Line Po 38 3.42× 10−004 1.75× 10−003 6.69× 10−004
Line Pf 38 2.00× 10−006 6.20× 10−005 3.90× 10−005
Generator Po 32 1.00× 10−002 1.20× 10−001 4.34× 10−002
Generator Pf 32 3.40× 10−004 2.22× 10−003 8.80× 10−004
CROW failures (see Section 8.1.3). These effects should be dwarfed by the overall
probabilities and as such are ignored.
Theoretical Results A simple calculation of the expected number of failures
per component was performed as a test for the Monte Carlo sampling. This simply
uses the average outage probability multiplied by the number of components. The
expected number of failures given in Table 8.3 should approximately match the
results obtained from the Monte Carlo Sampling in the next section.
Monte Carlo Results and Comparison One million samples were run and
it can be seen from Table 8.4 that the theoretical and Monte Carlo results match
to within a few per cent. It should be noted that lines can also fail because of
correlated common right of way failures. For this reason, the line outages are
expected to differ more than the other components. It is likely due to the low
probability of this tripping type that it is not noticed in the final results. The
error is likely to be even smaller if individual probabilities are used instead of
averages.
147
Table 8.4: Comparison of Theoretical and Monte Carlo Results in 1,000,000
samples
Name Theoretical Monte Carlo % Error Abs Error
Bus Po 888 861 3.0 27
Bus Pf 72 65 9.7 7
Line Po 25110 25117 0.0 7
Line Pf 1481 1441 2.7 40
Generator Po 758554 764102 0.7 5548
Generator Pf 27779 27657 0.4 122
Testing The Simulator
Although the simulator has been used before and has formed an important part
of other Ph.D. theses [35, 16, 32] it was important to ensure it worked in the
context of what was done for this work. There was also additional code that
needed to be checked.
14 test cases were generated that tested a variety of code paths and covered
a range of edge cases. These are given in the code below.
def main_test(out_stream):
"""print the results and the intermediate file for
a number of interesting scenarios, so we can check
by hand if the intermediate file generator and the
simulator are doing the correct thing.
"""
batch_string = ""
# base - as normal
batch_string += "1, base, None, , 1.0\n"
# half load power
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batch_string += "1, half, None, , 0.5\n"
# tenth load power
batch_string += "1, tenth, None, , 0.1\n"
# island
batch_string += "1, island, None, , 1.0, B11\n"
# removed 1 slack bus
batch_string += "1, slack, None, , 1.0, G12\n"
# removed all slack busses
batch_string += "1, slack-all, None, , 1.0, G12, G13, G14\n"
# remove 1 line
batch_string += "1, line, None, , 1.0, A2\n"
# remove 1 generator
batch_string += "1, gen, None, , 1.0, G24\n"
# remove 1 bus without generators
batch_string += "1, bus, None, , 1.0, 104\n"
# remove 1 bus with generators attached
batch_string += "1, bus-gen, None, , 1.0, 101\n"
# remove slack bus and all slack generators
batch_string += "1, bus-slack, None, , 1.0, 113\n"
# remove bus that causes island
batch_string += "1, bus-island, None, , 1.0, 208\n"
# load power high
batch_string += "1, high-load, None, , 1.10\n"
# load power above max gen power
batch_string += "1, over-max, None, , 1.15\n"
149
These were tested and simulated. The results of the simulation as well as the
intermediate file were checked by hand to make sure the program was working
correctly.
The intermediate file is the combination of the sample and the base load-flow
file that forms the input to the load-flow program. There were various things that
could be checked. The most important was checking that the correct components
had been removed and that the load and generator power totals were correct. The
base load-flow file has 172 busbars and 222 branches with result in a file with a
total of 397 lines. If no components have been removed this should remain the
same. The removal of a generating unit should not cause a change in the total
power output as it should be counteracted by the mismatch fixing code described
earlier, but there should be a reduction in the number of busbars and branches
to reflect that change.
Once the intermediate files were checked the results of the simulation were
checked as well. The removal of line B11, for example, causes the system to be
islanded which should result in a result of “false” coming back from the simulator.
Table 8.5 and Table 8.6 shows the summary of the results and forms a quick
reference for future checking. Creating such checks means that the program itself
can be changed easily for reasons of speed or clarity without worrying that it
may have broken some part of the program. Changes such as this are discussed
in the next section.
Improving Simulator Performance
It was possible to improve the program to make it run faster, once the program
was working and the tests were largely automatic. The largest improvement was
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Table 8.5: Simulation Test Checklist - Intermediate File
Test Name # Busbars # Branches Lines in File
base 172 222 397
half 172 222 397
tenth 172 222 397
island 172 221 396
slack 171 221 395
slack-all 169 219 391
line 172 221 396
gen 171 221 395
bus 171 220 394
bus-gen 167 215 385
bus-slack 168 215 386
bus-island 171 219 393
high-load 172 222 397
Table 8.6: Simulation Test Checklist - Results File











bus-slack Slack -265 -265+(285.3-285.3)
bus-island Island -171 -171
high-load True 855 855
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built in to the design of the program, namely to only simulate samples that were
different from each other. This saved many orders of magnitude of time enabling
testing to be done on one computer rather than hundreds.
Manually improving the speed of code is notoriously difficult. Optimisations
that seem logical can slow down execution due to cache sizing issues and compiler
optimisation. The key tool in reducing the run-time of a program is the use of
a profiler. Python, the language this program is written in, comes with it’s own
profiler which is thankfully easy to set up.
If the following code -m cProfile -o profile.prof is added to any python
run it creates a file containing profile information. This can be analysed in various
ways but the easiest is to do the following:
elif args[0] == ’profile’:





This produces a text-based output of the profile, which makes it easy to see
which parts of the program are the slowest. The focus of optimisation can then
be directed to the most important part.
The program used for this work is actually made of a number of almost com-
pletely separate code paths and hence the results of profiling are completely
different depending on the options given to it. This meant that the profiler had
to be run on each stage of the programs operation and the results of it analysed
separately.
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On one run of the program there were 355 functions included in the output in
total. Of these only 39 functions actually spend more than 0.01 seconds executing.
It seems obvious that the focus of the optimisation should focus on just those
39. Of those 39, 12 functions spent more than 15 seconds executing and three
actually took longer than a minute. Table 8.7 shows the results of this run but
the exponential decay is more easily seen in Figure 8-10. Note that most of the
functions are internal functions which I cannot optimise but I may be able to
reduce the number of times they are called.
Table 8.8 and its corresponding graph in Figure 8-11 show that although there
is the same drop-off rate in function execution time the different task causes
various different functions to be the main cause of slowdown.
In Table 8.8 the function called Ensure takes a fair amount of the execution
time but its only purpose is to check the program is working properly, it performs
no useful calculation. As long as the program has been well tested this function
could be removed saving over 6 mins from the execution time without changing
the output at all.
Required Number of Simulation Samples
Tests were performed, as detailed below, to ensure that enough samples were
taken. If there were not enough samples results could be spurious. This is
discussed in Section 7.5.1 as point 7. Performing too many samples wastes time;
time which could be spent improving the accuracy of the simulation in other
ways.
The number of required simulations was determined in the simplest fashion
that works well. If the result is stable in repeated runs then the number of
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Figure 8-10: Execution Time of Slowest Monte Carlo Functions
Figure 8-11: Execution Time of Slowest Simulation Functions
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Table 8.7: Profiler Output for Monte Carlo Generation
# calls time function
3125914 233.799 sample failures
911953657 94.213 random
124417069 67.913 as csv
12997901 59.788 str.join
1 42.152 main failure
12996899 33.858 Scenario.str
9860000 25.726 combine scenarios




1 7.376 generate n unique
3125915 6.463 failure scenario generator
3125914 6.452 random.normal
3125914 5.938 get crow
3125914 5.891 round
3125915 4.452 make sample generator
3125914 2.724 actual load2
3125914 2.529 crow failures
4279242 2.095 math.log
3125914 1.924 quantised 05
3127096 0.629 len
11000 0.111 scenario from csv
1001 0.076 stream scenario generator
1 0.034 output scenario
12008 0.023 str.split
68501 0.014 str.strip







1 0.001 init .py
1 0.001 main.py
120 0.001 read branch
1 0.001 init .py
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Table 8.8: Profiler Output for Simulation





9751366 15107.11 cleanup output
3814361971 7376.932 readline
13730243660 6967.25 str.strip









1697809764 2191.069 is slack bus
9059008903 2138.692 len
9870987 1916.243 communicate with poll







1939278531 737.549 find total gen
19741974 512.453 dict.keys
9870987 496.926 subprocess.py








9751366 374.08 check limits
9601860 332.461 find limit min
29612961 296.08 file.close
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samples is not the limiting factor hence it is unlikely the result will change simply
by running more simulations.
First, a set of 100 base-cases were generated to form the basis of the test.
Next, contingencies were generated using the Monte Carlo Sampler. This was
done repeatedly starting with 1 unique sample going up an order of magnitude
each time until 100,000 unique samples had been tested. These results were
analysed to find the probability of acceptability in each case.
If the probability of acceptability for each base case is the same for any two
sets of sample sizes then we know that the smaller of the two has enough samples.
For example if 1,000 and 10,000 both had the same results to a certain number of
significant figures then running more samples is not likely to change that number.
The results for one such test on a particular base-case are shown in Table 8.9
and Figure 8-12. The change tapers off as the number of samples increases. The
difference in the results with 10,000 and 100,000 samples is very small meaning
it is not worth doing more than 10,000 samples.
Table 8.9: Finding the Required Number of Samples
# Unique # Unacceptable # Actual P(Acceptable)
1 0 1 0.0000
5 0 14 0.0000
10 0 34 0.0000
50 2 580 0.3448
100 8 1347 0.5939
500 98 14213 0.6895
1000 522 67813 0.7698
5000 7539 1078238 0.6992
10000 21832 3150946 0.6929
50000 448340 64421520 0.6959
100000 1794430 257651817 0.6965
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Figure 8-12: Finding the Required Number of Samples
8.4 Using the Program
The following piece of code is the shell script that does each stage of simulation
in order to produce the final analysis. First, it removes old files, then generates
base cases and simulates them. Then it generates contingencies and simulates
the combination of both. Finally analysis is done on the results of the simulation.
#!/bin/sh
echo "start", $1, $2
python2 main.py clean
python2 main.py base-case $1 > base-case.csv
python2 main.py simulate < base-case.csv > base-case-result.csv
echo "base-cases done"
python2 main.py contingency $2 < base-case-result.csv > combi.csv
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echo "generate contingencies done"
python2 main.py simulate < combi.csv > result.csv
echo "simulate contingencies done"
python2 main.py analyse < result.csv > analysis.csv
echo "analysis done"
8.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter details the software used to form the results of this thesis. It details
decisions made during its construction, such as why a particular network was
chosen. It also discusses and analyses some of the tests created as part of the




This chapter contains the results gained from the computer program detailed in
the previous chapter. It is broken down into a number of sections. First the
results are gathered after creating the contingencies from Monte Carlo Sampling.
The next two sections have results created from single (N-1) then double (N-
2) component failures. This allows a comparison of how well N-1 and N-2 are
predictors of the Monte Carlo sampling.
After that the program is modified to begin incorporating unscheduleable gen-
eration and then modified again to look at unpredictable power output. The aim
is to determine how the level of security changes with unpredictable generation
such as wind.
9.1 Base Cases
The script given in Section 8.4 was run producing 1000 base cases and 10,000
unique contingencies all generated from Monte Carlo Sampling. This section























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is not necessary or helpful to give all 1000 base cases in the text. Table 9.1
shows the summary of 20 base cases selected at random to give an idea of the
sort of output the computer program produced.
The column that is of most interest is the third one. This is the number of
unacceptable contingencies divided by the total number. It is this number that
aims to represent the overall security of that base case. Taking the first row as
an example, in around 3 million contingencies about 1000 were unacceptable and
would need emergency operator action. If the number of unacceptable cases were
higher it would mean it was more likely that the system operator would need to
perform emergency action. This is discussed further in the next section. This
section focuses on the fourth and fifth column which describe the make up of a
base-case.
An intuitive feel for the normal state of system operation can be gained from
Table 9.1. In most of the cases there were a number of components out of service;
these were almost all generators. This is what was expected from the probabilities
these are based upon but by viewing it this way it becomes easier to visualise.
9.1.1 Load Level Forecast
The load level mostly hovers at around half the maximum output, indeed it is
the modal value with between 14 and 16% of base-cases having a power level of
0.5 times the maximum. The range of powers spanned from 0.35 at the lowest to
1 at the highest. It is interesting to note that the median value was around 0.6
meaning that on average 40% of installed capacity was unused. This is shown in
Table 9.2. It is shown graphically in Figure 8-5 in an earlier chapter.
Interestingly if the forecast was high in the base-case, a contingency may cause
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Table 9.2: Frequency of Load Levels in Base-Cases















the power required to be higher than the power available. This is a clear example
of an adequacy issue. Not very surprising as the system in question is used in a
lot of adequacy studies.
9.1.2 Number of Components on Outage in Base Cases
The number of components that are out for repair or maintenance in each base
case ranges from 0 to 13, the exact frequencies are shown in Figure 9-1 and Table
9.3. One surprising result is that in one base-case 13 separate components were
unavailable. This does not take into account the fact that the loss of a single
busbar may remove a number of generating units, which could make that result
higher. The modal value of component outages was 4 with 5 coming in a close
second. The median was also between 4 and 5 meaning, for this system, at any
given time one would expect 4 components to be non-functioning.
97.5% of all failures were of generating units making up 4123 of the total 4229
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Figure 9-1: Component Outage Frequencies in Base Cases
components that were on outage in all the 1000 bases-cases. There were 100 line
outages in the base cases corresponding to a total of 2.4%. The final 0.1% of
outages were caused by a fault on a busbar, there were only 4 of these in all the
base-cases.
9.1.3 Excluded Base Cases
There were 13 bases cases that were excluded from further analysis (see Table
9.4). These were ones that were not stable or they had limit violations even
before contingencies were applied. For example, there is no reason to run all the
contingency tests on a base case that is already islanded. Unless random failures
manage to remove all but the main island it will never have any acceptable cases
and will simply skew the results without adding to them.
It would have been possible to manually re-balance the failed system, this
is what would happen in reality; unfortunately it opens more questions than it
solves. If the system were to have been balanced for the failed cases; why not
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Table 9.3: Frequency of Outages in Base-Cases















balance all of them to the same degree. If that is done then analysis would
depend heavily on the type of stability/security constrained optimal power flow
that was used. For this reason it was decided that all base-cases that fail an
initial simulation would not be included in the rest of the analysis.
Given more time it would be interesting to study the failed base-cases. They
are likely to be of interest to a system operator and excluding them is not ideal.
9.2 Contingencies from Monte Carlo Sampler
This section looks at the contingencies generated by Monte Carlo Sampling.
There were a total of 10,000 unique sample which resulted in an actual total
of 3,125,913 samples. A selection of these is given in Table 9.5. The same set of
contingencies were used against each base-case to find the number of acceptable
cases, hence only one set of Monte Carlo Sampled contingencies were generated.
Table 9.6 shows that certain contingencies occurred very often. Over a million
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Table 9.4: Unacceptable Base Cases
Failure Reason Load Level Outages Components
limits 0.8 G71, G6, G35, G72
limits 0.8 G24, A10, G34, G89, G70, A12-1, G67, G56, A32-1
limits 0.75 G22, B24, G71, G45, G72, G63
divergence 0.6 G74, G90, G13, C5, G47
islanded 0.85 C11, G35, G23, G72
limits 0.9 G24, G39, G74, G45, B10, G98
limits 0.85 G31, G23, G97, G96, G57, G55, G47, G13, G64
limits 0.4 G33, B15, G89, G19, G90
limits 0.7 G71, G24, G3, G72
islanded 0.65 G41, C11, G83, G72
limits 0.55 G31, G5, C10, G12
limits 0.7 G76, B10, G1
divergence 0.8 G57, G66, G56, G90
limits 0.65 G6, G5, G67, G99
Table 9.5: First 20 Contingencies Generated using Monte Carlo Sampling
Repeat Simulation Result Load Level Outages Components
3 islanded 0.9 C34, C30
24 ok 0.95 C12-1
1 ok 0.95 G94, B21
1 ok 1 G97, G72
1 ok 1 G97, G73
3 ok 0.95 G50, G99
1 ok 0.95 G62, A30
1 ok 0.95 G50, G93
1 ok 1 G7, G55
1 ok 0.95 G50, G94
1 ok 1 G94, G57
2 ok 1.05 G67, G10
1 ok 1.05 G67, G18
1 ok 1.1 G77, G1
1 mismatch 1.2 G3
1 mismatch 1.2 G5, G55
1 ok 0.9 G67, G10
25 ok 0.85 G79
21 ok 0.85 G78
13 ok 0.85 G75
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samples had no change to the base case as can be seen in the first line. It is
also interesting to note how quickly the number of repeated contingencies drops
off, with an order of magnitude decrease from the 5th to the 6th most frequent
contingency.
The result in the 7th row (where the Simulation Result is ”mismatch”) means
the simulation failed as there was a mismatch between the supply and demand,
i.e. there was not enough generator capacity.
Table 9.6: Excerpt of Most Frequent Contingencies








2508 ok 1 G6
2494 ok 1 G5
2491 ok 1 G39
2478 ok 1 G71
2477 ok 1 G38
2464 ok 1 G35
2463 ok 1 G2
2452 ok 1 G34
2447 ok 1 G68
2413 ok 1 G67
2398 ok 1 G1
2371 ok 1 G72
1602 ok 0.95 G34
9.2.1 Load Forecast Error
The load forecast error (shown in Table 9.7 and Figure 9-2) is rather simple as
it is just a Monte Carlo sampled normal distribution with a mean value of 1. At
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Figure 9-2: Frequency of Given Load Level
the upper power levels demand actually starts to become greater than the system
can supply as can bee seen on the 7th row of Table 9.6.














Table 9.8 and Figure 9-3 shows the number of contingencies that had exactly
X component failures. Obviously these fall at an exponential rate showing how
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Table 9.8: Frequency of Component Failures






unlikely it is to have multiple components fail within an hour of each other
without an external factor causing all the effects.
Interestingly there were 11 cases where 4 components failed at the same time.
This is a hugely unlikely event but it did happen so it is worth looking at. To give
a vague idea of this likelihood we can assume that all the one hour samples follow
one another. There were over 3 million samples each representing 1 hour and 11
of them have 4 simultaneous failures, this corresponds to 4 simultaneous failures
every 32 years. This is however, stretching what is realistic with the statistics,
and is used just to form a mental model of how unlikely the event is. To give
another comparison, some form of component failure occurred in one in every 12
samples, meaning about twice a day one would expect some sort of malfunction
somewhere on the system.
The total number of failed components in all simulations is 279,879 of these
264,025 were of generating units (94.3%); 15,190 were lines (5.4%); the other 664
were busbar failures (0.3%).
9.2.3 Probability of System Becoming Unacceptable
From the graph in Figure 9-4 it is easy to see that the number of failed contin-
gencies is highly non-linear and that there are a few outliers with a very high
probability of failure. These are outliers in the sense of being outside the main
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Figure 9-3: Frequency of Component Failures
grouping of results but not such that should be removed. These are interesting
cases where a system operator should know that the system is in a precarious
state and should be re-balanced to a new and more stable operating point.
Table 9.10 shows 20 of these cases. Even in that selection the number of
unacceptable cases goes up two orders of magnitude. The least secure base case
on this run actually had more chance of being unacceptable than not. Clearly
not a system that an operator would consider running.
By looking at these cases a few things should be obvious. There is not an
unusual number of components on outage. The load-power is higher than average
but this cannot be the sole determinant as there are many non-problematic cases
with a large number of components on outage and a high load forecast level for
example the 5th row from the bottom of Table 9.1. There are some patterns to
which generator are included in this set, for example 90 and G71 seem to turn
up a lot but this could be due to a statistical anomaly rather than a pertinent
feature.
170
Figure 9-4: Percentage of Contingencies that are Unacceptable with no Unsched-
uleable Generation
Figure 9-4 shows the percentage of unacceptable contingencies. The average
percentage of unacceptable contingencies for all base-cases is 0.3% which works
out to be 10,419. This is clearly skewed by a few base-cases. Most cases fall
between 1,000 and 10,000 unacceptable contingencies. The base-cases with the
fewest unacceptable cases is shown in Table 9.11, the lowest having a percentage
of 0.03%. The largest percentage of unacceptable base-cases was 60% and is
shown in Table 9.10.
There were a variety of reason why a simulation might fail to find an accept-
able solution, these are shown below:
ok There were no problems found in the simulation.
component out of limits Line limits were exceeded.
divergence Failed to find stable solution.
islanded System split into multiple parts.
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failed to find a replacement slackbus All available slack buses removed.
mismatch The fix-mismatch function found that demand outstripped supply.
Table 9.9 lists the frequency of these events for the base case. This varied
massively depending on which base case was selected, as is to be expected. The
reason the number of power mismatches was so high in the base case was that it
has a power level of one which is very close to the maximum amount of load the
system can support. A more realistic figure would be the average power level,
which is half that of the base case.
Table 9.9: Reasons for Unacceptable System States
Result of Simulation Frequency
ok 3104289
component out of limits 868
divergence 249
islanded 184
failed to find a replacement slackbus 7
mismatch 20316
9.3 Contingencies from N-1 & N-2
9.3.1 N-1
Each base case was again tested against a set of contingencies. Unlike the previous
section the contingencies were not generated randomly. These were generated by
assuming one component fails at a time. As there are 289 components (lines, gen-
erating units, busbars) in the system there are the same number of contingencies
to test.
Monte Carlo Sampling required 10,000 contingencies to be generated, hence






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9-5: Percentage of Failed N-1 Contingencies (Logarithmic)
we can greatly reduce the computational load required to analyse the security
of the system. This will be a great advantage to system operators who want to
optimise the system for stability.
Monte Carlo Sampling should give results which match reality closer, i.e.
more accurately than N-1. This is because the probabilities of certain events are
explicitly taken into account. N-1 is a sort of approximation of the full Monte
Carlo Sampling which considers only a certain subset of comparatively likely
events. It does fall down in some aspects, for example, the simultaneous loss of
generating units G71 and G72 is twice as likely to happen as the loss of line A7.
These sort of differences are not taken in to account in N-1.
Between 11 and 151 out of 289 contingencies failed on the different base-cases.
The median value was 18 again showing a high skew, there were a small number
of base-cases where a large number of contingencies failed. The results can be
seen in Figure 9-5.
Table 9.12 shows the reasons for failures occurring in all N-1 contingencies
across all base cases.
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Table 9.12: Reasons for Unacceptable System States in N-1
Result of Simulation Frequency
ok 268249
component out of limits 11332
divergence 3508
islanded 2120
failed to find a replacement slackbus 994
mismatch 27
Figure 9-6: Percentage of Failed N-2 Contingencies (Logarithmic)
9.3.2 N-2
The contingencies from this section were generated by selecting each combination
of two components as the ones that will fail. This gave a total of 41,616 contin-
gencies, far more than is needed using Monte Carlo sampling. On average 5200
contingencies resulted in unacceptable system states with the minimum being
3385 and the maximum 13,407. The percentage of failed contingencies is shown
in Figure 9-6.
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9.4 Comparing N-1, N-2 and Monte Carlo Sam-
pling
It would be very useful to see if N-1 or N-2 is a good predictor of the results
gained from Monte Carlo Sampling. It is also interesting to see how N-1 and N-2
differ. Figure 9-7 shows a scatter plot of the percentage of failed contingencies
in both N-1 and N-2. It is easy to see a high correlation between these two sets
of results, this is to be expected, N-1 and N-2 are very similar sorts of tests.
This is in contrast to Figure 9-8 which does not have such a high correlation.
This figure compares the results gained from N-2 to those from Monte Carlo
Sampling. It shows that the number of failed base cases in N-2 (and by their
high degree of correlation in N-1) is not a good predictor of the results gained
through Monte Carlo Sampling. As those results are meant to represent the
overall system security it means that the number of contingencies that fail N-1
is not a good predictor of system security.
Another way of looking at the data is to plot the percentage of failed con-
tingencies for each base case. This is done in Figure 9-9, in this figure the base
cases are sorted by the percentage of Monte Carlo sampled contingencies that
failed. If N-1 was a good predictor of the Monte Carlo results it would in some
way match the curve of the Monte Carlo results. This doesn’t happen enough for
N-1 to become a useful predictor. There is some change in the N-1 data point in
the right of the figure, although it seems just to be a higher variance.
These results bring in to question the value of performing a full N-2 simu-
lation. It can highlight problematic areas of a system but it will not take into
account the probabilities enough, potentially leading to securing the wrong parts
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Figure 9-7: Scatter Plot of Percentage of Failed Contingencies using N-1 and N-2
of the system. Risk is likelihood times consequence and N-2 doesn’t consider the
likelihood accurately enough. A probabilistic model such as the one used here
can give more accurate results in less simulation time.
It can even be used to find problematic areas of the system. The current
results tell you for a given system what the likelihood is that it will become
problematic. This can be inverted by counting the number of times a component
is in an unacceptable system verses an acceptable one. This will give a measure
of which components are problematic. To use the software in such a way requires
simply running a large MCS and simulating each contingency. Then, for each
unacceptable contingency, mark each component that failed. The total number
of marks that a component has across all contingencies tell a system planner how
often that component is problematic.
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Figure 9-8: Scatter Plot of Percentage of Failed Contingencies using N-1 and
Monte Carlo
Figure 9-9: Percentage of Failed Contingencies using N-1, N-2 and Monte Carlo
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9.5 Unscheduleable Generators and Wind Power
In the following two sections renewable energy is added in to the equation, specif-
ically wind power. There are two things notably different about wind power that
matters to this application. Firstly the power output of wind cannot be set like
it can with a conventional generator i.e. it is unscheduleable. Secondly the wind
forecast is often wrong by some extent meaning the predicted value will be partly
wrong i.e. it is stochastic.
One would expect that when the added uncertainty of wind power gets added
to a network the security would decrease. However, as this is a complex system
with many interacting parts, what is expected can be quite different from what
is experienced.
9.5.1 Wind Modelling Requirements
Wind power is not easy to model in the general case. For the purposes of this
work a greatly simplified model can be used as long as it exhibits the two factors
discussed above. There are still problems to be overcome, specifically:
• where on the network should wind power be added,
• what installed capacity should each wind farm be given,
• how is the power level for each wind farm determined in the base-cases,
• how does the wind forecast error get determined in the contingencies,
• what should the be total penetration of wind generation.
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9.5.2 Adding Wind To The IEEE-RTS-96
The first two points will be addressed at the same time as they are related. If new
generation was added to the network it would change the adequacy of the system,
this would greatly reduce the validity of the comparison between a system with
no wind turbines and one with. It would mean that the total installed capacity
was greatly increased but that lines were more likely to be overloaded. This is
the installed capacity at the busbars with new generating units would be higher.
Another option is to replace certain generating units with the same installed
capacity of wind generation. But wind power cannot replace conventional genera-
tion on a megawatt by megawatt basis [93]. It therefore makes more sense to put
in wind turbines such that when it is at the average load factor it produces the
same amount of generation as the unit it is replacing. Unfortunately this changes
the adequacy of the lines. By having the same power after the load factor is tak-
ing into account the new wind generator must have an installed capacity much
higher than the conventional generator it replaced; if the wind generator ever
happens to produce near its installed capacity the line will surely be overloaded.
It is not the purpose of this work to see how the power profiles of very similar
electrical networks cause differences in security. The aim is to find out how the
same network is affected by having the added uncertainty of wind turbines.
The easiest way to do this is to not change the network or base-cases at
all. Simply take the assumption that some generating units behave like wind
generation, in-that their output cannot change to smooth out errors in the load-
forecast or take up slack following faults on other components.
The changes that are required only modify the Monte Carlo Generation of
contingencies and they are as follows:
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1. Make some generators unscheduleable by excluding each them from the
fix-mismatch function. This means that those generators will not be able
to change power in response to changes in the network.
2. Make the designated generators’ power vary stochastically. Change the
power output of each generating unit that is designated as renewable by an
amount correlated with the probabilities in Table 7.1 from [10]. This repre-
sents the error in wind forecasting. Although to some extent the errors for
each site will cancel out in terms of the total power generated the difference
will have to be made up by the conventional generators1.
This allow easy comparison between the results in previous sections with
those that include wind generation. It also enables the two parts to be computed
separately to determine which has a bigger role in security.
9.5.3 Location of Wind Generation
Although wind power is not currently included in the IEEE-RTS a number of
published papers have done so. Most of these papers have added wind in addition
to the current generating units which is not ideal for the current application as
discussed previously. Because of this, wind has to be added based on other
criteria. As the IEEE-RTS does not represent a real system the location cannot
be chosen on factors such as wind availability as it would in reality. All that
is required is to adequately mimic what one might see. It is neither possible or
desirable to place all wind generation at one busbar, the desired wind penetration
is too high to allow that. It also does not makes sense to evenly distribute the
1Given a real power network it would be preferable to model the covariance of geographically
close wind farms
182
wind to all busbars, a real system is likely to have a number of busbars that
contain just conventional generation.
The possible location is further reduced by the desired penetration level.
9.5.4 Choosing Wind Penetration
As discussed in the introductory chapters many studies have looked at a pene-
tration of wind such that on average 20 % of the power comes from renewable
generators. Because of this 2 different penetration levels were chosen. One just
below at 15%, and one above at 30%. Having the one penetration level to be ex-
actly double the other allows a better comparison. There are certain generating
units that are identical on some busbars. The location of the wind generators
was chosen such that changin the penetration level did not change which busbars
contained wind generation. This was done by selecting only busbars where there
were two identical units on the same busbar.
By further restricting the selection of wind location to be around the desired
penetration level there were only a few options available. The one that matched
the desired penetration levels the closest was chosen. There were 12 generating
units that made up the 15% penetration level selection. These are shown in Table
9.13. The 30% penetration level consisted of converting another generating unit
of the same type on each of the busbars listed.
9.5.5 Simulation Results
The same scenarios are used here as in the experiment with only conventional
generators. Because of this, there is only one interesting column in the output
file for this experiment - the number of unacceptable contingencies. As was done
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Table 9.13: Unschedulable Generators at 15 % penetration













in the earlier experiment 10,000 contingencies were generated using Monte Carlo
sampling. Unlike the scenarios, which are the same for each experiment the
contingencies differ. It would have been possible to use the same contingencies
in this experiment but in the latter experiment, when a wind forecast error is
present in the contingencies, they need to be different.
There were a number of base-cases that failed to simulate properly. These
were excluded from further analysis as was done at the end of Section 9.1.3. This
meant that some experiments had more base cases than others, to keep the results
consistent only the bases cases that weren’t problematic in any experiment were
included in the final analysis. For example, if a base case had failed to simulate
when there was 30 % unscheduleable generation then it would be excluded from
the analysis of all other experiments including 15 % unscheduleable where it
might have actually passed the simulation. This reduction left a total of 795 base
cases that could be analysed in all experiments.
The percentage of contingencies that are unacceptable in each scenario is plot-
ted in Figure 9-10 and 9-11 for penetrations of 15% and 30% respectively. To
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Table 9.14: Summary of Failure Rates in Unscheduleable Experiments
Absolute Value Probability
Min Median Max Min Median Max
Conventional 911 9372 1473545 0.03 0.30 47.14
15% Unscheduleable 903 6326 1199363 0.03 0.20 37.80
30% Unscheduleable 934 80950 1958134 0.03 2.55 61.71
Figure 9-10: Percentage of Contingencies that Failed with 15% Unscheduleable
Generation
make the graphs clearer the scenarios are sorted by the percentage of contin-
gencies that are unacceptable. For comparison this was done the same way for
conventional generators in Figure 9-4.
The shape of the graph for the 15% penetration level is very similar to the one
with no unscheduleable generation, curiously it is also of a similar magnitude; the
modal value appears to be the same in both figures. Looking at the summary
table for this data Table 9.14 2 shows that the system actually becomes more
secure with small number of unscheduleable generators. This is counter-intuitive
and if not for the further analysis might be put down to an artefact of the few
2The same data is also shown along with the other experiments in Table 9.17
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cases with a very low security happening to skew the results. The clearer finding
is in the graphs; adding a moderate amount of unscheduleable generation does
not adversely affect the security of the system in this experiment.
Table 9.15: Relative Failure Rates in Unscheduleable Experiments
Conventional Unscheduleable
15% 30%
Conventional - 195 574
15% Unscheduleable 600 - 635
30% Unscheduleable 221 160 -




Conventional - 25 72
15% Unscheduleable 75 - 80
30% Unscheduleable 28 20 -
As the scenarios and network remained constant between experiments and the
number of simulations produces a consistent result another form of comparison
can be used. Table 9.15 and Table 9.16 compare the number of scenarios that
are more secure in each experiment; if there were no differences between the
experiments the results would be around 50:50. It is more easily seen in the
second table where the number is expressed as a percentage of the number of
scenarios tested.
For example, 75% of the scenarios were more secure with 15% of the gener-
ation coming from unscheduleable generation when compared to the case of all
conventional generation. This again gives further weight to the finding that un-
der these specific conditions having a reduced number of generators that change
their output in response to the network is actually a stabilising factor. This may
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Figure 9-11: Percentage of Contingencies that Failed with 30% Unscheduleable
Generation
however be due to a factor of the simulation method or of the simplified way in
which the pick-up of power mismatch is modelled.
When the penetration level was doubled there was a noticeable difference in
the resulting output. Figure 9-11 shows the profile of security across scenarios as
it did for the four experiments to come before it.
With the most secure contingencies the result is comparable to the two pre-
vious experiments. This can also be seen in Table 9.14 where the minimum
probability is the same to two decimal places (at a level of 0.03%). However
the graph becomes quite different in the less secure cases. There are many more
cases that are less secure and the least secure scenarios are considerably less se-
cure than those in the other experiments so far. For this system at least having
30% of the system unable to react to power changes results is a much less secure
system. In Table 9.16 it shows that 72% of the scenarios were less secure than a
system with all conventional generation and 80% were less secure than a system
with a small number of unscheduleable generators.
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9.6 Wind Variability
The final stage is to take into account the stochastic nature of wind. Again the
bases cases were not changed, only the contingencies were modified. The power
output of the selected generators was randomly perturbed based on the figures
in the one hour forecast delay of Table 7.1.
This additional variability changed the number of samples that were dupli-
cates, in the case of 30 % stochastic generators 10011 samples resulted in only
11 that were duplicated. This does mean that results are not quite as accurate
as in earlier experiments but based upon the analysis in the tests of the previ-
ous chapter they should be enough to draw conclusions from. The number of
contingencies sampled in each scenario is shown in Table 9.17.
Table 9.17: Summary of Failure Rates in all Experiments
Failure Rate
Number Contingencies Min Median Max
Conventional 3125913 911 9372 1473545
15% Unscheduleable 3172811 903 6326 1199363
30% Unscheduleable 3172925 934 80950 1958134
15% Stochastic 23353 4 146 10590
30% Stochastic 10011 4 1007 6236
Table 9.18: Summary of Percentage Failure Rates in all Experiments
Min Median Max
Conventional 0.03 0.30 47.14
15% Unscheduleable 0.03 0.20 37.80
30% Unscheduleable 0.03 2.55 61.71
15% Stochastic 0.02 0.62 45.35
30% Stochastic 0.04 10.06 62.29
As with the experiments with unscheduleable generation the results are shown
in three forms: as a graph of the number of unacceptable contingencies for each
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scenarios Figure 9-12 and Figure 9-13; as a table summarising the percentage
of unacceptable contingencies in Table 9.17 and as percentages in Table 9.18;
and finally as a comparison showing which scenarios were more stable in which
experiment, again shown as raw values in Table 9.19 and as percentages in Table
9.20.
Curiously the case with 15% penetration again seems to be more secure in
some ways than the system with all conventional generation. There are two
points to this, firstly the modal level of unacceptable scenarios is lower as can
be seen from Figure 9-12, secondly the number of scenarios in which it was more
secure was higher than in any other experiment, this is shown in the fourth row
of Table 9.20. Given more time it would be interesting to see if this artefact holds
true with a different underlying network or a more accurate simulation model is
used. While it is not strong enough evidence to conclude that having wind power
makes the system more secure it does at least show that at low penetrations the
addition of renewable power is unlikely to case a problem to the security of the
network.
Table 9.19: Relative Failure Rates
Conventional Unscheduleable Stochastic
15% 30% 15% 30%
Conventional - 195 574 271 744
15% Unscheduleable 600 - 635 290 752
30% Unscheduleable 221 160 - 208 758
15% Stochastic 522 505 587 - 727
30% Stochastic 51 43 37 68 -
The clearest finding of all the experiments is the one with 30% of the gener-
ation being stochastic in nature. Figure 9-13 shows that it is significantly less
secure. It also does not level of to a clear modal value like the others experiment.
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Figure 9-12: Percentage of Contingencies that Failed with 15% Stochastic Gen-
eration
Table 9.20: Relative Failure Rates (as percentage of base cases)
Conventional Unscheduleable Stochastic
15% 30% 15% 30%
Conventional - 25 72 34 94
15% Unscheduleable 75 - 80 36 95
30% Unscheduleable 28 20 - 26 95
15% Stochastic 66 64 74 - 91
30% Stochastic 6 5 5 9 -
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Figure 9-13: Percentage of Contingencies that Failed with 30% Stochastic Gen-
eration
This is reflected in Table 9.20 where over 90% of scenarios were less stable under
these conditions. The average percentage of scenarios that were problematic was
four times higher than the next worse as shown in Table 9.18.
9.7 Chapter Summary
Scenarios (or base-cases) were generated and analysed by simulating them under
a number of different conditions. The conditions for generating contingencies and
analysing scenarios were:
1. N-1: All single component failures
2. N-2: All combinations of two components failing
3. MCS (Monte Carlo Sampling) where all supply is conventional
4. MCS where 15% of supply came from unscheduleable generators
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5. MCS where 30% of supply came from unscheduleable generators
6. MCS where 15% of supply came from stochastic generators
7. MCS where 30% of supply came from stochastic generators
The first three conditions assumed all generation was conventional i.e. it could
be scheduled to produce a given amount of power and would produces that unless
the component completely failed. Under these conditions three experiments were
run, the first two tested all single and double component failures, the third used
Monte Carlo Sampling (MCS) to generate the contingencies. It was shown that
there was not a high degree of correlation between the number of contingencies
that failed with MCS and the number that failed with N-2.
The next two conditions assumed a certain percentage of the supply could no
longer be scheduled i.e. the unit would not respond to changes in the system and
simply had a set power output. This was run at 15% and 30% of supply. At 15%
there was not much change in the output compared to conventional whereas at
30% many more scenarios had a high number of problematic contingencies.
The remaining two conditions modified the same generators again to simulate
errors in the power level expected. This represents how wind has to be forecast
and that the forecast can be wrong. Again this was run at 15% and 30% of supply.
At 15%-stochastic the results were relatively similar to the 15%-unscheduleable,
whereas almost all contingencies were significantly less secure when 30% of their




This thesis aims to show that the introduction of renewable power will adversely
effect the security of a power system at high levels of penetration. It also aims to
show the inadequacy of N-1 in a system with a high penetration of renewables.
Before that question was posed a literature review of future power systems
determined that wind farms will make up a large proportion of the system mix
in the future. Due to their inherent inability to be scheduled and their stochastic
generation they are also significantly different in operation to conventional gen-
eration. This brought about the more specific question of how the introduction
of wind power will change the security of the system.
To analyse the security of the system, current simulation techniques were
reviewed based upon the requirements of the work. A number of avenues for
further work were identified to increase the speed of the simulations. A load-flow
simulator was chosen and integrated into a suite of tools that can be used to
analyse security or compare security assessment schemes.
These computer programs were extensively tested to ensure their correct and
fast operation. Experiments were also done to determine the number of samples
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required in each scenario to ensure reliable results.
The program works by taking a probabilistic model of the network including
failure rate of various types of components as well as load forecasting and models
of error rates in wind forecasts. This data is fed into a Monte Carlo sampler to
produce a number of contingencies. These represent likely changes to the system
in the one hour delivery period. By simulating these contingencies and cate-
gorising them as acceptable or unacceptable a measure of the level of security is
obtained. For instance if one scenario had 100/1,000,000 contingencies that were
unacceptable then it would be more secure than a scenario with 500/1,000,000
unacceptable scenarios.
The scenarios themselves were also generated through Monte Carlo simula-
tion, in total 1000 scenarios were generated, of which over 700 were used in the
final analysis.
This program was used in two ways:
1. Each scenario was tested with N-1 and N-2 and the results of the simu-
lations were again categorised as acceptable or unacceptable. If N-1 was
a good predictor of system security then there would be a high degree of
correlation between the level of security calculated earlier and the number
of N-1 contingencies that were unacceptable. This was found not to be the
case. N-1 and N-2 do however have a high degree of correlation between
each other.
2. The underlying system and scenarios were modified to gradually introduce
renewable generation. This was done in two ways. Firstly a certain set of
generators that account for 15% of total generation had their output power
fixed, i.e. they became unscheduleable. The next stage was to take the same
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generators and vary their power stochastically based upon normal error
levels in wind forecasts. Both parts were run again at double the penetration
(30%) to see how that changed the security level. If the introduction of
renewables has no effect on the security then the results from each of the
four tests should be the same as the first set of test where all generators
were conventional. In fact there were significant differences found between
the experiments.
When the penetration was low the introduction of renewables had a small
stabilising effect. This was true both in the form of unscheduleable and stochas-
tic generation. This is highly counter-intuitive and good cause for further study.
That further study is a significant undertaking given that each experiment re-
quires millions of simulations to be run. It may be that this counter-intuitive
effect disappears when the network is changed to be based upon a real system.
Although most scenarios were fairly comparable between the experiment with
15% unscheduleable generation and the one with 30% unscheduleable generation
there were some noticeable differences. Certain scenarios are inherently less secure
than others, looking only at the least secure the difference seems to be much larger
in the experiment with higher penetration. In other words if the power system
is already weakened then having fewer generators that can be called upon to
pick-up the mismatch causes a them to become even worse.
The most noticeable effect of all experiments comes from the one where 30% of
generators vary stochastically. Almost all scenarios were significantly less secure
than in any of the other experiments.
This work echoes the findings discussed in the first chapter of the thesis, that
at low penetrations the introduction of renewable generation is not likely to pose a
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significant problem to the security of the system, but as the penetration increases




As with all research this work opens up many avenues for further work. This
chapter expands on a few of those ideas to present possible avenues of research.
In general the literature review on power system simulation identified a number
of areas where potential improvements were possible. The computer program
also provides two areas for expansion. Firstly the computer program itself can
be improved to provide a more accurate simulation. Secondly, the program can
be used for a number of additional areas of study. These were introduced in the
relevant chapters but will be re-examined here. One final area for further work
comes from the conclusions themselves. The findings discussed naturally open
up more questions as to the nature of power system security analysis.
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11.1 Improvements to Power System Simulation
11.1.1 GPGPU ODE Solver
The proposed work demands a large number of simulations to be performed
quickly. It was for this reason that so much energy was spent on creating a dy-
namic simulator that has a faster execution speed than those currently available.
There are still great advances to be made in this area and the one that looked
the most promising is moving the ODE solver to the graphics cards (GPU). Huge
increases in speed have been reported using this method but, as the GPGPU
programming is very new, it is an underdeveloped area. It not only allows the
speedup to come from the specialised hardware but it will require a redesign that
would necessitate being able to calculate different machine equations in parallel.
This should have a near linear speed-up due to the low overheads involved.
11.1.2 New Simulation Software
While it was not possible in this body of work due to the simulation time, it
should be possible to replace the load-flow program with a dynamic simulator.
This would enable the work to take into account a much wider range of issues
which can not be represented by a load-flow.
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11.2 Improvements to the Developed Computer
Software
11.2.1 Parallelisiation
As each simulation is independent of any other it should be possible to compute
many different simulations at the same time. This would result in a linear speed-
up of execution time allowing many more experiments to be run. For example,
if five computers each with two processor cores were set-up to perform the sim-
ulation then it should operate at nearly 10 times the speed. This would have
enabled the work to contain 50 different experiments rather than five. If this was
possible it would be interesting to increase the penetration level in small steps of
around 5% to see exactly how the results differed.
11.2.2 Better Accounting for Consequence in the Com-
parison Program
One of the limitations of this work is its poor treatment of consequence. A line
overload is treated as equally bad as system collapse. This is simply unrealistic.
One way to overcome this was briefly mentioned in Section 7.5.1. This scheme
involves tripping loads until the system is stable and in-limit. The amount of
load that needs to be shed is a measure of how severe that scenario was.
199
11.3 Other uses for the Developed Computer
Software
11.3.1 Testing of Planned Network Changes
If a new piece of power system plant is about to be introduced it is vital to know
how it will effect the security level. The tools used in this thesis are already
suitable for this work without modification. For instance it might be interesting
to see how a HVDC line running down the centre of the UK would change the
security.
11.3.2 Catalogue of Problematic Network Sections
If every simulation performed on a network was saved to a database there are
a number of interested queries that can be answered by it. The most obvious,
and potentially useful, is to find the components that are good predictors of a
unstable scenario. One might find that when a certain component is on outage
it greatly reduces the overall security of the system. This would be valuable
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